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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is a defense of a particular answer to van Inwagen’s 
Special Composition Question: when is it the case that some objects together 
compose some additional object? The answer is the conjunction of two claims. 
The first claim, compositional nihilism says that, necessarily, there is never an 
instance of material composition, and therefore all material objects that do exist 
are simple, or without proper parts. The second claim, existence monism, says that 
there exists a material object, and that all other material objects are identical with 
this object. In other words, there is just one material object that extends 
throughout the entirety of the material world.  
 
These claims are formalized as follows, where (N) represents compositional 
nihilism and (M) represents existence monism: 
 
(N)  [∀x: x ∈ M] ~∃y(Pxy ^ x ≠ y) 
(M) [∃x: x ∈ M] ∀y[(y ∈ M) ⊃ (x = y)] 
 
Other claims will be argued for. While I do believe these additional claims are 
true, I am not committed to them as strongly as I am to compositional nihilism 
and existence monism. These other claims serve mostly compliment the primary 
two claims.  
 
The dialectic of the paper is essentially that of an argument to the best 
explanation. Alternatives to compositional nihilism – universalism and 
compatibilism – are eliminated on various grounds. Alternatives to existence 
monism – versions of pluralist nihilism – are also argued against. The idea is that 
the two views are the only strong candidates for an ontologically sound theory.  
 
One last task of the paper is to disarm various objections to the two primary 
claims. This is done by demonstrating that what was previously seen as 
objectionable consequences of the views are, in fact, unproblematic. In at least 
one instance, a previously objectionable consequence is shown to be, in fact, a 
potential benefit of the views.  
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In Defense of Existence Monism 
Following the seminal work of figures like David Lewis and Peter van 
Inwagen, there has been a marked increase of interest in material composition. 
Theories that would have previously been dismissed as patently absurd are now 
given more careful consideration. Much work has already been done in ontology, 
semantics, and logic to make sense of these views. In this paper I hope to present 
a relatively broad overview of the issues at play. I will then argue for a particular 
view, existence monism, in light of these considerations.  
The first aim of this paper is to provide a critical survey of various 
answers to the following question: ‘Under what circumstances does material 
composition occur?’ A (perhaps artificial) dialectic will be established to assist in 
navigating the plethora of issues involved with establishing a coherent answer to 
this question. The second aim of this paper is a defense of a particular answer to 
this question. Two central claims will be defended.  
The first claim, (N), is a response to van Inwagen's Special Composition 
Question. It says that, necessarily, there is never an instance of material 
composition, and therefore all material objects that do exist are simple, or without 
proper parts. Call this view compositional nihilism.  
Note that compositional nihilism does not specify how many simple 
objects exist. There are three types of ontology that include (N). They differ in the 
number and nature of the simples in the world. The first type, call it point 
nihilism, says that the simples that exist are as small as is physically (or 
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metaphysically) possible.
1
 Traditionally, it has been thought that this view implies 
that there are many point-sized simple material objects. The second position 
claims that there are simple material objects that are neither point-sized nor 
maximally extended. Call this intermediate nihilism. The last position, existence 
monism, says that there exists a material object, and that all other material objects 
are identical with this object. In other words, there is just one material object that 
extends throughout the entirety of the material world. I will at times call this view 
(M).
2
 (M) will be the second claim argued for in this paper. So that there is no 
question as to what these claims amount to, I formalize them as follows, where M 
is the set of all material objects and P is the parthood relation: 
(N)  [∀x: x ∈ M] ~∃y(Pxy ^ x ≠ y) 
(M) [∃x: x ∈ M] ∀y[(y ∈ M) ⊃ (x = y)] 
 
Other claims will be argued for. While I do believe these additional claims 
are true, I am not committed to them as strongly as I am to (N) and (M). These 
other claims serve mostly to answer questions generated by (N) and (M). The 
conjunction of them will present a comprehensive (and hopefully correct!) world-
view. Some semantic theses, in particular, will be important insofar as there is a 
strong need to alleviate the abrasion both (N) and (M) cause to intuitions about 
language. A developed Error Theory, for example, will be required to dispel some 
qualms about compositional nihilism. 
 
  
                                                          
1
 I mean to include in this type those views that claim space, and therefore simples, are discrete. 
2
 It may help the reader to contrast the first two from the third with the terms pluralist nihilism 
and existence monism, respectively. This distinction will become relevant later in the paper. 
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Section One 
In everyday discourse, we apparently make reference to an abundance of 
objects. For example, when at the dinner table we often talk about things like the 
new guy at work with the funny tie, the cat meowing below us, and the steak dad 
cooked tonight. Many of these, like my cat Gizmo, are things we can (prima 
facie) directly experience. Some objects, though, are of an abstract nature. The 
number three is not an object that one would expect to bump into on his way to 
work. And running into the property triangularity at the laundromat would be 
quite peculiar. 
This paper will focus on the first category, what we call material objects. 
A material object is one that is located in the material world. It has extension: 
length, width, height, and volume.
3
 The property of extension will be a necessary 
property held by all material objects.
4
 Furthermore, any object that is not material 
does not have extension. I hold the following formal claims as true. Where M is 
the set of all material objects, Pxy is the relation of x being a part of y and Ex is 
the property of extension: 
(1) [∀x: x ∈ M] Ex 
(2) [∀x: Ex] x ∈ M 
(3) [∀x: x ∈ M] ([∃y: Pyx] ⊃ Ey) 
 
                                                          
3
 I am open to the possibility that there are material objects that have as parts immaterial 
objects. Nevertheless, in discussing composition and parthood I will restrict myself to material 
objects whose parts are also material objects. 
4
 This unfortunately implies that point-sized simples might not be considered material objects. 
But I take it as obvious that such objects, if they exist, should count as material objects. In this 
case all material objects either (i) have extension, and therefore volume, etc., or (ii) are point-
sized. 
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That is, all material objects have extension; all extended objects are material 
objects; and all material objects have a part that is extended (and therefore 
material). 
The primary goal of this paper will be to provide an answer to van 
Inwagen's Special Composition Question. That is, when is it the case that two or 
more material objects compose an additional object? In good faith to Material 
Beings, then, the objective of this paper is not to explain what composition is, but 
rather to simply determine the conditions under which it occurs. An answer to the 
former question, I believe, is an overly ambitious goal, and one I am unsure how 
to go about answering. Formally, we can represent the Special Composition 
Question as:  
SCQ: When is it true that ∃y the xs compose y? 
Consider the food I've laid out on the kitchen counter. There are two 
pieces of bread, some ham, and a slice of cheese. The Special Composition 
Question amounts to this: under what conditions do the bread, the ham, and the 
cheese compose some further object? Note that SCQ does not say what this 
further object is, and does not establish anything meaningful about it beyond its 
existence and the parthood relations it bears. There are three broad types of 
answers that can be given to the Special Composition Question. They are 
differentiated by the number of potential composite objects:
5
 
                                                          
5
 Note that the following formalization of (U) is significantly more liberal than what most 
philosophers who are inclined towards this view accept. Specifically, they would require that x is 
not identical to y, and might require an overlap constraint, such that there is no “double dipping” 
of parthood. I leave the formalization as follows because it more clearly demonstrates the fact 
that (N), (U), and (C) complete the “logical space” of answers to SCQ. My arguments against (U), 
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(N) [∀x: x ∈ M] ~∃y(Pxy ^ x ≠ y) 
(U) [∀x: x ∈ M] [∀y: y ∈ M] ∃z(Pxz ^ Pyz) ^ z ≠ x ^ z ≠ y 
(C) ~(U) ^ ~(N), or: 
 [∃x: x ∈ M] ∃y(Pxy ^ x ≠ y) ^ [∃x: x ∈ M][∃y: y ∈ M] ~∃z(Pxz ^ Pyz) ^  z ≠ x ^ z ≠ y 
 
(N), or compositional nihilism, claims that there are no instances of 
composition. All material objects that exist have no proper parts. An object y is 
proper part of x if and only if Pyx and x ≠ y. Thus, no matter how I arrange my 
bread, ham, and cheese, they will never compose another object. All material 
objects are simple – without proper parts. 
(U), or universalism, claims that for any two distinct objects (x ≠ y), they 
compose an additional object. Thus, the two slices of bread compose an object. 
That object and the ham compose another object. And that object and the cheese 
compose yet another object. There is, however, an additional restriction implied 
by universalism. There are no two objects such that the first object has the second 
object as a part, in addition to having another part that is a part of the second. 
That is, all objects can be parts only once; there is no “double dipping” of 
parthood.
6
 Consider objects A, B, and 3. Object 3 is the composite of objects A 
and B. It is impossible for there to be a fourth object that is composed of object 3 
                                                                                                                                                               
however, will operate under the restricted understanding of (U). In fact, I informally introduce 
these restrictions in the following paragraphs. 
6
 While the semantic explanation and example provided are, I believe, accurate, I am unsure how 
to formalize the “double dipping” constraint. There are two ways of caching out the claim, as 
either a constraint on parthood or as a constraint on occupied regions. The parthood constraint 
reads, where PPxy is the relation of x being a proper part of y: 
 ~(∃x)(∀y)(∀z) PPyx ^ (PPzx ⊃ Pzy)  
The occupation constraint reads, using terminology employed in Parsons’ “Theories of 
Location”: 
~(∃x)( ∃y)( ∃z)( ∃r) (y@r ^ z@r)  ^ y ≠ z 
All of these might be entailed by a stronger thesis concerning identity conditions. But what 
has been said already is more than sufficient for this paper. 
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and object B. This is because object B is a part of object 3. Such a fourth object 
would be “double dipping” with object B. 
(C), compatibilism, claims that composition sometimes occurs, but not 
always. This answer is logically incompatible with either (N) or (U). Nihilism and 
compatiblism disagree on there being at least one composite object. Universalism 
and compatiblism disagree on there being an instance of failed composition. All 
three disagree on the number of possible composite material objects. 
Section Two 
In this section, I will first present a thought experiment. The design of the 
experiment is to introduce the notion of vagueness. I will then develop this notion 
and explain how it applies to theories of material composition. This will lead to 
some arguments against compatibilist-type answers to SCQ. 
Meet Charles. Charles has graciously volunteered himself for a 
demonstration. Charles is a middle-aged man and, unfortunately, has started 
balding. He isn't quite bald yet: he still has a relatively well-groomed mane. But 
there is a bald spot that has been growing for the past few months. Let n be the 
number of individual hairs on Charles' head right now, at time t1. N is a pretty big 
number. Just to be safe, let us spell out explicitly what we are already committed 
to:  
(1) Charles has n hairs. 
(2) Someone with n hairs is not bald. 
(3) Therefore Charles, with n hairs is not bald. 
 
Now comes the experiment. We sit Charles down on a comfortable chair 
and give him a big, juicy rib eye steak for his troubles. We then take a pair of 
tweezers and pluck out one of Charles' hairs. It seems obvious that we did not do 
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much to make Charles bald. Sure, we may have put him one hair closer to 
complete baldness. But we did not make him bald by removing a single hair. At a 
later time t2:  
(4) Charles has n-1 hairs. 
(5) Someone with n-1 hairs is not bald. 
(6) Therefore Charles, with n-1 hairs, is not bald. 
 
What if we kept plucking out a single hair of Charles, one by one, and 
asking ourselves at each juncture if he were bald? Surely, at some point he must 
become bald. After all, a man with no hair on his head is most certainly bald. But 
where is that point? A man with only a single hair would still, presumably, be 
bald. So, too, would a man with two hairs (as evidenced by Homer Simpson). 
Furthermore, the following principle seems to hold:  
(7) If someone with m hairs is bald, then someone with m+1 hairs is bald. 
The truth of this is seen in the implausibility that a single hair makes the 
difference between baldness and non-baldness. Imagine two men standing next to 
each other, one bald and one not bald. Would you expect there to be only a single 
hair to separate the two? Is that even possible? Even more troublesome is that it 
appears we can also reason in the opposite direction.  
(8) If someone with n hairs is not bald, then someone with n-1 is not bald. 
This is justified in exactly the same manner as (7). Losing a single hair cannot 
move anyone into a state of baldness. Above, we were confident that the removal 
of a single hair from Charles’ head did not make him bald. Thus, fully presented, 
the argument runs:  
(1) If someone with n hairs is not bald, then someone with n-1 hairs is not bald. 
(2) Someone with 100,000 hairs is not bald. 
(3) Someone with 99,999 hairs is not bald. [From 1 and 2] 
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(4) Someone with 99,998 hairs is not bald. [From 1 and 3] 
... 
(100,002) Someone with 0 hairs is not bald. [From 1 and 100,001] 
(100,003) Someone with 0 hairs is bald. [From common sense!] 
(100,004) Contradiction! 
 
As noted above, the argument could be run in reverse:      
(1) If someone with m hairs is bald, then someone with m+1 hairs is bald. 
(2) Someone with 0 hairs is bald. 
(3) Someone with 1 hair is bald. [From 1 and 2] 
(4) Someone with 2 hairs is bald. [From 1 and 3] 
... 
(100,002) Someone with 100,000 hairs is bald. [From 1 and 100,001] 
(100,003) Someone with 100,000 hairs is not bald. [From common sense!] 
(100,004) Contradiction! 
 
This type of argument is known as a sorites paradox. It is not restricted, of 
course, to baldness. Parallel arguments can be made for things like heaps of sand 
or garbage. There are a variety of replies to the paradox. The most common and 
successful is to admit that vagueness of some sort is at play. Importantly, 
however, there are at least two different ways to explain the vagueness: the 
linguistic theory of vagueness and the metaphysical theory of vagueness. 
Linguistic vagueness is manifested in expressions that do not have well-
defined application. While users of the expression ‘bald’ have a general idea of its 
application – one wouldn’t call Fonzi bald – there are cases in which the 
appropriateness of the expression is unclear. The defining feature in linguistic 
vagueness, however, is that the vagueness is in our language. One can imagine 
that linguistic vagueness, in theory, is eliminable. For example, a world-wide 
conference could be called, at which we agreed to use ‘bald’ to refer to only those 
with exactly 75 or less hairs. The vagueness is a result of our indecision as a 
linguistic community. 
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Metaphysical vagueness, in contrast, insists that there is sometimes simply 
no fact of the matter. Vagueness is irresolvable. When an individual has a certain 
amount of hair, it becomes impossible to successfully refer to any fundamental 
and determinate property. This is just because there is no fundamental property 
referred to; there is no fact of the matter and, in such instances, standard logic 
fails to obtain.
7
 
There are significant differences in the two approaches. The first, 
acceptance of linguistic vagueness, permits one to unproblematically resolve the 
paradox. The reason the paradox exists is because ‘bald’ has no well-defined 
application. We never agreed on an exact use of the word. The contradiction is 
avoidable because at least one of the premises, under this view, is false. Which 
premise is false? Well, that depends on where the linguistic vagueness enters. One 
option is to claim that we agree the boundary between baldness and non-baldness 
is vague; in this case we would deny premise (1) and therefore deny the principle 
that allows the argument to be run. 
Metaphysical vagueness places actual vagueness in the world. This is 
troublesome because, as will be shown later, it violates standard logic. I admit that 
there is probably no formal argument that can be given to disprove metaphysical 
vagueness. Nevertheless, I believe it is unreasonable to accept it. One would 
presumably only be motivated to do so because one can then hold onto other 
intuitively true claims. But why should one discard the appeal of the Law of 
Excluded Middle for the appeal of, for example, everyday material objects? At the 
                                                          
7
 Perhaps I should restrict myself here to a denial of the Principle of bivalence. I’m happy to do 
this. 
10 
 
very least, insofar as we hold deep intuitions about standard logic I see no reason 
to abandon it. Some truths in standard logic reflect the strongest of our intuitions. 
Further, I believe that the attempts of metaphysicians to explain away the 
respective intuitions are more successful in the case of radical ontologies. That is, 
one’s intuitions can be more successfully assuaged in the case of ontology than in 
the case of logic. Indeed, there is even some intuitive appeal (evidenced by 
historical suppositions) to non-standard ontologies. Nevertheless, the 
abandonment of standard logic will be discussed later in Section Four and Section 
Five. 
The sorites paradox often arises when the property in question appeals to 
some manner of degree. Above, it was suggested that properties that fall under the 
sorites paradox cannot be fundamental. This is because such a property, if it is to 
be coherent at all, is vague. And fundamental properties cannot be vague: 
If a property falls under the sorites paradox, then it is not a fundamental 
property. 
 
In what follows, I will briefly present a couple arguments against various 
compatibilist-type answers to SCQ. The arguments here are unsophisticated, and 
much more can be said for and against them. The more sophisticated versions of 
these arguments are not my own. In Material Beings, van Inwagen presents a 
more fair and comprehensive argument against these views. Nevertheless, I 
present the quick and dirty arguments below to demonstrate that attempts to 
answer SCQ along these lines will lead to us down a dangerous rabbit hole. 
Among compatibilist-type answers to SCQ are those that appeal to some 
manner of spatial relations between parts. Prima facie, this type of answer is 
11 
 
promising. Consider again our ham sandwich. Isn't it just when we take the ham 
and cheese and place them between the bread that a ham sandwich is formed? 
This, certainly, is a case in which the distance between the parts is relevant. There 
is no sandwich when the parts are scattered across the kitchen counter. But what 
about the parts getting closer allows for a sandwich to form? 
How about a direct appeal to distance between parts? Our ham sandwich 
does not come into existence until all the parts are some distance away from each 
other. But recall the argument given against baldness. Where would one mark the 
distinction between there being a ham sandwich and there being no ham 
sandwich? When the parts are one meter apart? One centimeter? One micrometer? 
Surely my sandwich is allowed some measure of shifting without falling out of 
existence. When I eat my ham sandwich, the parts necessarily move. 
Consequently, the spatial relations that hold between the parts change. This 
doesn’t mean the sandwich goes out of existence. In short: 
(1) If two parts n units apart form an object, then two parts n+1 units apart 
form an object. 
 
Unfortunately, this is sufficient to run a sorites paradox: 
(1) If two parts n units apart form an object, then two parts n+1 units apart form 
an object. 
(2) Two parts 0 units apart form an object. [If there is any distance that permits 
composition, it is this] 
(3) Two parts 1 unit apart form an object. [From 1 and 2] 
(4) Two parts 2 units apart form an object. [From 1 and 3] 
... 
(100,002) Two parts 100,000 units apart form an object. [From 1 and 100,001] 
(100,003) Two parts 100,000 units apart do not form an object. 
(100,004) Contradiction! 
 
Thus, any answer to SCQ that appeals only to the spatial relations that 
hold between objects introduces vagueness. Recall that fundamental properties 
12 
 
cannot be vague. I assume that composition is a fundamental property. 
Composition seems to be one of the most metaphysically basic notions. Surely the 
relevant properties are fundamental – in what else could they be grounded? 
Because of this, the above argument demonstrates that an answer to SCQ cannot 
appeal only to the spatial relations that hold between objects.
8
 
Then perhaps the objects need to be touching. But if that were the answer 
to SCQ, then every time two people shake hands, they form a new object. Surely 
this is not the case. Let us call this answer to SCQ Contact: 
To get the xs to compose something, one need only bring them into contact; if 
the xs are in contact, they compose something; and if they are not in contact, 
they do not compose anything.
 9
 
 
Contact being thus defined, we can use van Inwagen’s argument against it: 
 
(1) If Contact is true, then every time two people shake hands, an object is 
formed. 
(2) It is not the case that every time two people shake hands, an object is 
formed. 
(3) Contact is not true. 
 
Van Inwagen calls appeals to various strengths of connectedness between 
parts as fusion-type answers. A similar line of reasoning as that against Contact 
denies all answers that appeal to such connectedness between the parts. 
Furthermore, “in contact” and “touching” are terms that would require substantial 
elaboration if they were to supply an answer to SCQ. Sub-atomic particles do not 
touch in any ordinary understanding of the word. Let us therefore set aside these 
compatibilist-type answers to SCQ. 
                                                          
8
 The argument can be run analogously to time, and I suspect to any other quantitative relation. I 
am less certain if the conjunction of these falls under the sorites paradox, but I will not address 
this in this paper. 
9
 Contact and the following argument against it appear in pp. 33-37 of Material Beings 
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Section Three 
It is an interesting observation that, frequently, a philosopher defends his 
favored theory of material composition by arguing that it is the least-bad of all the 
theories available. Many utilize a reductio strategy. For example, van Inwagen 
himself begins his defense by arguing against fusion-type answers to SCQ. Sider, 
likewise, defends nihilism by (at least in part) attacking universalism. In 
mereology, it seems, the best defense is a good offense.  
Part of this reality is likely due to the fact that both nihilism and 
universalism commit one to claims that, prima facie, are completely absurd. Of 
course tables and chairs exist, and of course there is no object that is composed of 
the tip of my nose and the Eiffel Tower. Because of this, much of the work to be 
done by a proponent of one of these views is to alleviate the perceived crazy-ness 
of the view. Thus we see the introduction of van Inwagen’s Paraphrase Strategy, 
Lewis’s supervaluationism, and context-sensitive semantics. 
Recall that the dialectic has been driven most centrally by our attempts to 
seek an answer to van Inwagen's Special Composition Question. Three answers, 
nihilism, universalism, and compatibilism, were offered. The answers are 
logically incompatible and, in fact, exhaust the logical possibilities.
10
 This is most 
clearly seen by summarizing the three as answers to the following: when does 
composition occur? Never; always; sometimes.  
Compatibilism is the juicy steak (or respective soy product) of material 
composition. It looks and tastes delicious – and is nine times out of ten what we 
                                                          
10
 Technically, they do. But universalism, as I have formalized it, is not widely held. Rather, many 
proponents hold some restriction on composition such that parts of a composite object do not 
overlap. Thus, the “realistic” possibilities do not exhaust the logical possibilities. 
14 
 
most want to order on the menu. But it is by no means healthy for us. Substantial 
philosophical exercise must be done in order to not keel over from the 
cholesterol-ridden after-effects of compatibilism. First and foremost, one must 
answer a follow-up question: Ok, composition only sometimes occurs, but under 
what conditions?  
In Section Two it was argued that composition is never based merely on 
the spatial relations of the parts. Other compatibilism-type answers have been 
given. In Section Four we will discuss van Inwagen’s answer, that composition 
occurs only when a life is involved. But Ned Markosian goes a different route. 
When pressed to offer a complete answer to the SCQ, containing the conditions 
under which composition does and does not occur, Markosian simply refuses to 
answer. That is, he claims that there is no answer to the SCQ. More formally, he 
holds that "there is no true, non-trivial, and finitely long answer to SCQ," 
(Markosian 214). Thus, facts about composition are brute; they do not obtain in 
virtue of some other fact or facts. Call this view Brutal Composition. 
There is, however, considerable virtue in giving a systematic and general 
answer to SCQ. What metaphysicians hope to uncover are those principles that 
most fundamentally govern the world. Prima facie, such principles are necessary 
truths and obtain in all possible worlds. The correct answer to SCQ, insofar as an 
answer reflects a metaphysically fundamental principle, should be necessarily 
true. Any string, finite or otherwise, of brute facts about composition is 
contingent. This is due to the contingent nature of some objects. My cat Gizmo is 
not, sadly, a necessary object; in some world she could fail to exist. Thus, any 
15 
 
answer containing brute compositional facts about Gizmo is itself contingent. 
While a full ontological picture of the world will always include brute facts, the 
brute facts according to Brutal Composition are of a different kind, an 
unacceptable kind, than the brute facts according to the alternative answers to 
SCQ.
11
 
There might be one more objection against Brutal Composition. As 
suggested above, there might be a problem explaining the modality of 
compositional facts. It is thus far an open question whether modal truths about 
composition are equally brute as non-modal truths. Are the non-modal truths 
grounded in the modal truths, or are the modal truths grounded in the non-modal 
truths? Which are brute? While these are hard questions, they are not questions 
that I think pose any special challenge to Brutal Composition. The grounding 
problems raised here are orthogonal to the veracity of Brutal Composition with 
respect to SCQ. 
At any rate, let us set aside Brutal Composition. We are attempting to find 
a true answer to SCQ. Brutal Composition is not, in the intended sense, an answer 
to SCQ. It seems intuitive that composition, whatever it may be, is at the very 
least more than a series of brute facts. Perhaps for Markosian it is different. 
Indeed, he makes it clear that certain intuitions about vagueness and strange 
objects outweigh intuitions about giving a systematic answer to SCQ: “For the 
fact that Brutal Composition is the only response available that is consistent with 
my intuitions about compositional matters seems to me a good reason to prefer 
                                                          
11
 To say a bit more: The amount of simples that exist in the actual world may be, according to 
pluralist nihilism, a brute fact. But this fact, unlike a Brutal Composition fact, is not an alternative 
to any plausible metaphysical principle. 
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Brutal Composition over the other responses,” (Markosian 240). While I do hold 
many of the same intuitions Markosian holds, for me they do not outweigh the 
almost insurmountable intuition that there exists a necessary and systematic 
answer to SCQ. 
Section Four 
Thus far, we have established three broad categories under which an 
answer to SCQ may fall. It was then argued that compatibilism faces significant 
challenges. Insofar as a compatibilism-type answer must explain the conditions 
under which composition occurs, it was argued that such an answer cannot appeal 
to spatial or temporal relations. Some other notion must do the heavy lifting in an 
answer to SCQ. One such answer, already mentioned, is the one van Inwagen 
presents in Material Beings:  
VIW: (∃y the xs compose y) if and only if the activity of the xs constitutes a life 
 (or there is only one of the xs),”. 
12
 
 
What this means, is that a life, as an event, is the only relevant element in 
matters of composition – except, of course, the simples themselves. What life is, 
exactly, is critical to van Inwagen’s answer. If the notion of a life does not work 
as it should, then his answer, like other compatibilism-type answers to SCQ, is 
eliminated on pain of incoherence or contradiction.  
There are similarities between appeals to distance of parts for composition 
and van Inwagen’s explication of what it means to constitute a life. Prima facie, 
both seem to be the correct answer. Simples are more or less “caught up” in the 
objects they compose. The ham sandwich became a sandwich when the various 
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 From p. 82 of Material Beings 
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parts came sufficiently close together. Likewise, a particular simple constitutes 
my life just when it becomes sufficiently involved. I eat some chicken, my body 
digests it, and the protein of the chicken is incorporated into my muscles, which I 
later use to eat more chicken. 
Just as the former is susceptible to a variation of the sorites paradox, so 
too is the latter. One might ask, at which point is the chicken “sufficiently 
involved” in my life? When the chicken is digested? When it is in my mouth? The 
problem is the same as that of Section Two. Van Inwagen is quite aware of this. 
In the final parts of Material Beings, he admits that the problem is inescapable 
and, if we are to salvage his answer to SCQ, we must admit of vagueness in the 
world. That is, it is not merely a linguistic matter that leaves us wondering at what 
exact point a simple partially constitutes a life. There is no fundamental, 
metaphysical answer to this question. There is no exact point at which a simple 
partially constitute a life; simples vaguely constitute a life. This vagueness is 
formalized as follows. For any life, there is a set of simples that collectively 
constitute it. Each member of this set is “caught up” in the life to some degree 
between 0 (exclusive) and 1 (inclusive). The degree to which a simple is caught 
up in the life of an organism is reflected in our intuitive picture. The chicken I eat 
is definitely part of me when it constitutes my muscle fibers. But when it is still 
being digested, maybe it isn’t as caught up. We can reflect this uncertainty by 
saying that a given simple of the chicken, when entering my stomach, is caught up 
to degree 0.56; that same simple, when part of my muscle fiber, is caught up to 
degree 1. 
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One immediate objection to VIW is that it introduces vagueness into the 
world. In Section Two, the differences between linguistic vagueness and 
metaphysical vagueness were explicated. It was also stressed that, while linguistic 
vagueness is not exactly a good thing, metaphysical vagueness is a much more 
threatening beast.  
In the balding Charles thought experiemtn, one might be – should be – 
willing to abandon baldness. There is something meaningful that ‘bald’ tracks, 
one could say, but nevertheless there is no metaphysically fundamental property 
of baldness that Charles acquires. One could go even further and present 
vagueness into the property baldness. When pressed why, he might reply, why 
not? Who’s to say that baldness cannot be vague? 
Well, that might work for baldness. But an answer to the SCQ, insofar as 
it makes existential claims, is in a tougher spot. What would it mean for an object 
to only vaguely exist? That is to say, what is the nature of an object, whose 
corresponding existential proposition is neither true nor false? Can properties 
affix to such an object? Is this object material? Immaterial? Both? In short, while 
some of metaphysics may permit the introduction of vagueness, the nature of 
existence is not so cordial. An object either exists or does not.  
 In Material Beings, van Inwagen is all too aware of this difficulty. In fact, 
he is so aware that he not only explicates the issues of vagueness that his answer 
to SCQ gives, but proves each step of the problem: VIW introduces vague 
composition, which introduces vague identity, which introduces vague 
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existence.
13
 Nevertheless, van Inwagen argues that metaphysical vagueness is not 
all that bad. VIW and a related non-standard system of logic are fully coherent and 
potent in all the ways originally desired. This is a critical move, because it is not 
vagueness per se that is bad.
14
 Rather, it is the violation of our system of logic, in 
particular our existential quantifiers. If it is vague – that is, there is no fact of the 
matter – whether there exists some objects x that is the sum of some simples P, 
then our quantification logic is not sound. We might try to formalize the 
vagueness of composition under standard logic with disastrous results: 
(1)  ~(∃x: x is the sum of P)  [It is not true that P collectively compose an object] 
(2) ~~(∃x: x is the sum of P) [It is not true that P does not collectively compose  
an object] 
(3) ⊥ [1, 2] 
 
This shows that standard logic lacks the tools to explain metaphysical vagueness. 
Van Inwagen solves this with the introduction of the indef operator. The operator 
is attached to propositions that are neither true nor false. Thus, the above logical 
representation of vague composition, under van Inwagen’s logic, is inappropriate. 
Instead, we would say: 
indef (∃x: x is the sum of P)  [It is indefinite whether P collectively compose an 
object] 
 
By introducing the indef operator, van Inwagen provides a non-standard logic to 
explain the truth-value of propositions about composition.
15
 
                                                          
13
 More specifically, van Inwagen is committed to the claim that sometimes it is indefinite 
whether there exists an object y composed of the various xs. This is importantly different than 
the claim that there exists an object y such that it is indefinite whether it is composed of the 
various xs. The latter is significantly less feasible than the former.  
14
 Although some certainly think it is. 
15
 For simplicities sake I have omitted the full formalization of his logic. Missing is the 
introduction of monadic predicate-letters used to represent various properties. Also missing is 
the means with which we can evaluate his logic. Such details, while important, are irrelevant to 
the current discussion. 
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 Much has been said about metaphysical vagueness, and the consequences 
it entails. The last third of Material Beings is, in effect, a defense of metaphysical 
vagueness. Likewise, many have said that metaphysical vagueness is simply 
impossible, and any theory that entails it is false. Terry Horgan and Matjaz Potrč 
do just this in Austere Realism, as does Mark Heller in “Against Metaphysical 
Vagueness”. I consider metaphysical vagueness to be massively problematic. It is 
a serious commitment, and insofar as I am afraid of serious commitment, to be 
avoided. That being said, I will not argue in this paper that belief in metaphysical 
vagueness is completely indefensible. I confess to being somewhat persuaded of 
van Inwagen’s response to arguments raised against his acceptance of vagueness. 
While his defense is not enough to accept that there is metaphysical vagueness, it 
is enough to accept that a somewhat plausible theory of material composition that 
includes metaphysical vagueness can be given. Van Inwagen has established an 
impasse; it just so happens that we are on opposite sides of it. 
I would like to instead raise an objection that is more specific to VIW. 
Recall that VIW says that parthood is a matter of degree. Some simple x is caught 
up in some life, and therefore (partially) composes some object y, to some degree 
z, where z is a number between 0 and 1. If z is 0, then x is definitely not a part of 
y. If z is 1, then x is definitely part of y. If z is between these two numbers, then it 
is “sort of” part of y. That is, there is no fact of the matter, or, in van Inwagen’s 
terminology, it is indefinite whether x is a part of y. The tracking of indeterminacy 
to a continuous number scale is critical because, otherwise, the view is subject to 
the same objections raised at the beginning of this paper. In short, if x either is, is 
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not, or is indeterminably (vaguely) part of y, it is arbitrary to demarcate the 
boundaries of these terms. Just like it is arbitrary in the original sorites paradox 
for there to be a distinct boundary between composition and noncomposition, it is 
arbitrary for there to be a distinct boundary between composition and 
indeterminate composition, and indeterminate composition and noncomposition.
16
 
Here, however, it is even less plausible to appeal to vagueness. What would it 
mean for there to be an indeterminate boundary between indeterminacy and 
determinacy?  
 While van Inwagen avoids this problem, his method of doing so creates a 
new one of its own. “We assume that (at any given moment) any given simple is a 
part of x to some precisely specifiable degree, a ‘degree’ being a real number 
greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1,” (van Inwagen 223). Is it 
reasonable to make this assumption? In other words, why is it the case that 
parthood follows a continuous scale? What grounds the continuous nature of 
parthood? 
 Here, one might appeal to distance relations born between objects. The 
piece of chicken is only a part of me to degree 0.06 because it has only just 
entered my mouth.
17
 That is, it is spatially close to my teeth, spatially distanced 
from my stomach and muscle fibers, and so forth. When it is in my stomach being 
digested, it is part of me to degree 0.56. That is, it is spatially close to my 
stomach, spatially distanced from my mouth, and so forth.  
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 This is argued for in Heller’s “Against Metaphysical Vagueness”. 
17
 That is, the simples arranged mouth-wise that are to varying degrees part of me. The following 
account obviously disregards the problem of composition as identity.  
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 But surely these distance relations are not what grounds parthood. The 
interactions of the simples that are relevant to determining if there is life – and 
therefore a corresponding organism – are more intimate. The problem, however, 
is determining just what these relations are. Van Inwagen employs various 
analogies and metaphors (and quotes other philosophers giving analogies and 
metaphors) in an attempt to explain the relevant factors in something “being 
caught up in” a life.  
In his most illuminating passage, van Inwagen tells us a story about a 
carbon atom undergoing various biological and chemical processes of a particular 
life until, at the end of the day, the atom is no longer caught up in the life: 
Alice drinks a cup of tea in which a lump of sugar has been dissolved. A certain 
carbon atom that is part of that lump of sugar is carried along with the rest of 
the sugar by Alice’s digestive system to the intestine. It passes through the 
intestinal wall and into the bloodstream, whence it is carried to the biceps 
muscle of Alice’s left arm. There it is oxidized in several stages (yielding in the 
process energy, which goes into the production of adenosine triphosphate, a 
substance that, when it breaks down, provides energy for muscular contraction) 
and is finally carried by Alice’s circulatory system to her lungs and there 
breathed out as a part of the carbon dioxide molecule. The entire process – 
Alice began to do push-ups immediately after she had drunk her tea – occupied 
the span of only a few minutes.
 18
 
 
 How van Inwagen intends to explain these scientific processes is unclear. 
Presumably, however, scientific processes are to be explained through causality. 
This is reflected on page 12 of Material Beings where he claims that “whether 
certain objects add up to or compose some larger object does not depend on 
anything besides the spatial and causal relations they bear to one another.” Thus 
parthood is explained by the causal relations born between various objects. Thus 
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 Material Beings pp.94-95 
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the continuous scale of parthood is explained by the causal relations born between 
various objects. 
How the continuous scale is explained is a much more difficult question, 
one that I do not think has an answer. Whatever causal relations are, they are not 
easily (if at all) quantified. Furthermore, how are the various causal relations to be 
organized, such that when one combination of causal relations occurs the chicken 
is part of me to degree 0.06, and when another combination of causal relations 
occurs the chicken is part of me to degree 0.56? While I do not have a formal 
argument to present, I nonetheless have a worry that the coherent “causal space” 
that van Inwagen requires does not exist. At the very least, there is significant 
work to be done to answer this question and, as noted elsewhere, the burden of 
proof is on the proponent of (C) to provide a satisfactory answer. 
 One final point against VIW is that, once we accept metaphysical 
vagueness in some instances of material composition, we have little reason to 
deny it in others. Van Inwagen insists that composition only occurs when an 
object is associated with a life. But the purpose of Section Seven of Material 
Beings is to demonstrate the problems a theory of composition that posits 
everyday ordinary objects like chairs and tables generates. The introduction of 
metaphysical vagueness is one such problem.
19
 Later, with his introduction of a 
non-standard logic, van Inwagen offers a defense of VIW that accepts 
metaphysical vagueness. But why not accept some more liberal view of 
composition, whereby even tables and chairs exist? It was argued earlier that 
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 Indeed, this is where many philosophers jump ship. Others discussed in this paper, such as 
Lewis and Horgan, use this as a starting point for their own theories of material composition. 
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retaining our everyday commitment to ordinary objects is desirable. If we have 
the tools to do so, we should utilize them. Why does van Inwagen choose not to? 
He does not choose to because he does not believe that there is a satisfactory 
answer to SCQ that includes tables and chairs.  
But this is too hasty a conclusion. His dismissal of theories like Contact 
was prior to his introduction of vagueness. Perhaps a move similar to the one van 
Inwagen makes could also be made by the champion of tables and chairs to avoid 
his arguments. A given simple, x, is part of a given table, y, to some degree z. 
Like before, z is any number between 0 and 1, with 0 representing definite non-
parthood, and 1 definite parthood. One might ask what grounds the degree to 
which x is a part of y. The simple answer, the champion says, is that there are 
some causal relations held between various objects that ground the degree to 
which the various parts are part of the table or chair.  
But what are these causal relations, and how do they interact? Well hold 
on, the champion says, you’re not being fair. Why are you pushing me and not 
van Inwagen on this? Fair enough. Let us be fair and wait for both of them to 
provide an adequate answer to (C). Meanwhile, let us explore the alternatives. 
Section Five 
Let us again remind ourselves of the dialectic. Of the three types of 
answers to SCQ, this paper argues that nihilism is true. Compatibilism-type 
answers are as of yet either incomplete or unsuccessful. It is on the shoulders of a 
proponent of compatibilism to provide a coherent and complete answer to “under 
what conditions does composition occur?” Universalism, however, has all the 
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initial appeal that nihilism does. We must therefore demonstrate that (U) is false, 
or at least do our best to convince ourselves that it is less plausible than (N).  
First, it must be noted that universalism commits us to very, very strange 
objects. To use the oft-cited example, consider the tip of my nose and the Eiffel 
tower. According to universalism, there exists an object composed of just those 
two parts. Now consider that object and the New York Giants. There is also an 
object composed of just those parts.  
Universalism is just a theory of composition; it requires an input to 
produce an output. Like compositional nihilism, it does not posit simples. That is 
the responsibility of another theory. It does, however, strongly suggest a theory in 
which there is a plurality of simples. Assume, for demonstration, that (M) is true. 
The conjunction of (U) and (M) entails (N). That is, if a universalism-type theory 
stated there were one simple, and in particular one very large simple, then it 
would prove true a rival theory. This is pretty weird. Pending an argument in 
favor of universalism with large-scale simples, let us take universalism to claim 
that there is a plurality of very small simples.
20
 
Consider another complication that a proponent of universalism must face. 
Prima facie, there are many things in the world – or at least some object or 
objects that occupy a lot of space and time. Any theory of composition must take 
this empirical fact into accord.
21
 Consider, also, the pressure on a theory of 
composition to help explain our use of words like ‘cat’ and ‘table’. In Section Six, 
some revisionary linguistic theories are presented to reconcile (N) with everyday 
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 Another option is that the world is gunky, such that every object has proper parts. I believe 
what I say about (U) below can be modified to accommodate this option. 
21
 We are dismissing empty ontologies as simply false. 
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discourse. What happens, though, when the opposite problem occurs, and we have 
not too few objects, but too many? How does reference operate with such an 
ontology? 
Consider my cat Gizmo who is currently resting on the sofa in the living 
room. According to universalism, there are many objects present in the region of 
space around where Gizmo is. Specifically, there is an object that contains all the 
cells, tissues, organs, and every individual hair. There is also an object that 
contains all the cells, tissues, organs, and every individual hair but one. Call these 
objects cF and cF-1, respectively. Now, Gizmo is somewhat advanced in age, and 
has less hair than she used to. Let us say that there are currently 1000 hairs in this 
cat-shaped region. Universalism dictates that there is a material object just like 
cF-1, except with one less hair; call it cF-2. We can see that this results in there 
being at least 1001 material objects, all of which contain all the internal cells, 
tissues, organs, and also containing a decreasing amount of hairs: cF, cF-1, cF-2 
… cF-1000.  
This is a species of Peter Unger’s Problem of the Many, and has received 
extensive treatment.
22
 Most notably, in “Many, but Almost One” David Lewis 
admits that there are many objects;
23
 nevertheless, for most semantic purposes, 
there is one cat. That is, when I utter ‘There is exactly one cat in the living room’, 
I utter something true. How can this be? We just said there were at least 1001 
nearly identical objects that could equally qualify as a cat! 
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 Some notable differences: I am granting that there are at least 1001 material objects in the 
area. I am focusing on, instead of ontological claims, the problem of reference generated by said 
claims. This is, of course, meant to lead into a discussion of supervaluationism. 
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 Whether they are cats, cat-like, or some other entity is not relevant here. 
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Here, the notion of supervaluation is essential. Supervaluationism is a 
theory designed to accommodate semantic indecision. Often times our words lack 
precise meanings. Nevertheless, we can determine the (super-)truth value of a 
particular utterance: “Call a sentence super-true if and only if it is true under all 
the ways of making the unmade semantic decisions; super-false if and only if it is 
false under all ways of making those decisions; and if it is true under some ways 
and false under others, then it suffers a super-truth-value gap,” (Lewis 29). In our 
case, there are many objects to which ‘cat’ may refer. Consider each of these 
possible references in turn: ‘cat’ refers to cF, ‘cat’ refers to cF-1, etc. It is true that 
in each case the truth-value of an utterance would be true. Thus, according to 
supervaluationism, an utterance of ‘There is one cat in the living room’ – where 
the precise reference of ‘cat’ is semantically indeterminate – is true. Importantly, 
Lewis notes, super-truth of utterances in a language is more important than truth. 
When we communicate, we attempt to convey super-truth, not truth simpliciter.  
There is something to the claim that super-truth is more important to 
language than truth. We are very sloppy when we talk. Our language is littered 
with homophones, homonyms, slang, and all manner of indeterminate words. 
(How many hairs, after all, does it take to be considered ‘bald’?) It seems unlikely, 
then, that we have exactly one intended reference for every word we use.   
All this ignores an interesting, and important, motivation for (U). One of 
Lewis’ most prominent motivations for universalism is the Argument from 
Vagueness. A version of this argument has already been presented in Section 
Two. In short, if we admit of some restrictions in our composition (that is, 
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prescribe to compatibilism), then we must admit of vagueness in composition. On 
page 212 of On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis details this argument: 
The trouble with restricted composition is as follows. It is a vague matter 
whether a given class satisfies our intuitive desiderata for composition. Each 
desideratum taken by itself is vague, and we get still more vagueness by trading 
them off against each other. To restrict composition, in accordance with our 
intuitions would require a vague restriction. It’s not on to say that somewhere 
we get just enough contrast with the surroundings, just enough cohesion, … to 
cross a threshold and permit composition to take place, though if the candidate 
class had been just a little worse it would have remained sumless. But if 
composition obeys a vague restriction, then it must sometimes be a vague 
matter whether composition takes place or not. And that is impossible. 
 
This is essentially the same motivation given by Horgan and Potrč in Austere 
Realism. But the latter utilize the Argument from Vagueness for a version of (N). 
This is because the argument, as constructed, merely rejects some versions of (C). 
It is silent on whether (N) or (U) is true. Now, it is a fact that most philosophers – 
Lewis and van Inwagen included – think that “I”
24
 exist, and that “I” am a 
composite material object. These are independent theses, though, and require 
independent justification. They are also theses that create tension for both (N) and 
(U).
25
 Let us therefore set them aside, as it applies equally to our two remaining 
theories. 
  Recall that so far we have also refused to accept vagueness in 
composition. Specifically, in Section Four it was argued that vague composition 
(and vague identity and existence) is metaphysically problematic and to be 
avoided. There is likewise no vagueness in composition with (N) – there is no 
composition! Thus, while Lewis’ argument rejects (rightly so) compatibilism-type 
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 Relative to the speaker. i.e. “I exist”, when said by David Lewis, means David Lewis exists.  
25
 For (N) because there are no composite material objects, for (U) because composite objects do 
not change parts. 
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answers to SCQ, nihilism-type answers are unscathed. The question remains, then, 
why we should accept (U) in favor of (N).  
 There are two general points in favor of nihilism over universalism. The 
first is the argument from ontological parsimony. If (N) and (U) accomplish the 
same explanatory work, then we should prefer (N) because it posits fewer objects. 
The second is the argument from weirdness. As has already been noted, 
universalism claims that all sorts of weird objects exist. For example, the object 
composed of the tip of my nose and the Eiffel Tower. It is impossible to 
comprehend the nature of these objects, and therefore any theory that entails them 
is false. 
 The argument from ontological parsimony has been given in a variety of 
formats. In Austere Realism, Horgan and Potrč provide a version that is most 
relevant to our discussion. The argument can be formalized as follows:
26
 
(1) If one ontological theory is more parsimonious than another ontological 
theory, then, all things being equal, there is strong theoretic reason to 
prefer the more parsimonious theory. 
(2) (N) is more parsimonious than (U). 
(3) All things being equal, there is strong theoretic reason to prefer (N) over (U). 
(4) All things are equal. 
(5) There is strong theoretic reason to prefer (N) over (U).  
 
It is important to note that the argument only provides a theoretic preference for 
(N). It does not prove that (U) is false. The argument acts very much like a 
standard Ockham’s razor argument: it is more reasonable to assume simplicity in 
a system unless otherwise required.  
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 The argument is extracted from p. 183 of Austere Realism. I have taken the liberty of roughly 
translating the terminology employed there to the terminology applied here. Some nuances have 
been lost in the name of clarity. 
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 Of course, the strength of the argument turns on the strength of premise 
(4). Above, it was argued that universalism creates problems of reference and flies 
in the face of intuition. These are also problems faced by nihilism. Nevertheless, it 
has been argued that each problem has, at the least, the beginnings of a solution. 
The parallels between nihilism and universalism are quite striking. If these 
problems have solutions, then it seems the two theories are on equal footing. 
Thus, because (N) has less ontological commitments than (U), we should prefer 
the former. 
 There is a stronger argument against (U) that does not appeal to theoretic 
preference. This is the argument from weirdness. Formalized, it is: 
(1) If (U) is true, then there exists an object composed of the tip of my nose and 
the Eiffel Tower 
(2) There does not exist an object composed of the tip of my nose and the Eiffel 
Tower 
(3) (U) is false 
 
Why is there no object composed of the tip of my nose and the Eiffel Tower? 
Because such an object would be weird. How is one to understand such weird 
objects? 
At the very least, such an object’s nature is radically different than any 
object we regularly conceptualize. Its parts are vastly disjoint, some being over 
thousands of miles apart, and hold no meaningful non-mereological relations. 
Further, there seem to be no plausible causal relations that connect the various 
parts of my nose to the various bits of metal in the tower. There is also no way to 
categorize such an object. It is not an artifact. It is not biological. It is hard to see 
what sort of kind such an object would fall under. Such an object falls outside the 
scope of almost every conceptual tool we possess. This is not to say that such an 
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object is obviously metaphysically impossible. But without substantial 
justification, it is hard to accept weird objects.  
 The two arguments above fall short of being demonstrative proofs against 
(U). Some of the premises are controversial, and a proponent of universalism 
would have much to say against them. But that is just the point. Much needs to be 
said on behalf of universalism to justify rejecting these arguments. Such 
justification, I believe, is lacking. We should then turn to our last alternative, (N), 
and explore its plausibility. 
Section Six 
Once we accept (N), or any other species of austere ontology, we are in 
need of an explanation. Everyday discourse seemingly makes use of a variety of 
objects, mereologically simple or otherwise. According to compositional nihilism, 
though, these objects do not exist. What, then, is one really saying with an 
utterance of 'The sun moved behind the trees'? There is no such thing as a sun, 
and no such things as trees. What is the semantic story? Below, I will present 
various linguistic positions one can take in respect to an austere ontology. My 
presentation of the positions will not, however, assume any particular ontological 
theory.  
We will consider three options. First, one can say that such utterances are 
false. After all, 'sun' and 'trees' fail to refer to any object existing in the world. 
According to this position, call it the Error Theory for Everyday Discourse – or 
simply Error Theory, much of what is said in everyday discourse is simply false.  
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One would like, however, to differentiate between sentences like 'The 
grass is green', in which something prima facie true is conveyed, and sentences 
like 'The grass is blue'. It would be a significant blow to Error Theory if 
utterances of the two above sentences always had identical semantic worth. A 
well-fleshed theory, then, will have to accommodate this with some "pseudo-
truth" condition. This will be developed later in the present section. 
Another semantic position is to claim that utterances made in everyday 
discourse, while true, do not contain the same propositional content that their 
face-value suggests. This is done through what I will call Paraphrase Strategy. 
An utterance like 'The sun moved behind the trees' is true, for example, because it 
is shorthand for a claim about a complex collection of astronomical facts.  
The last option is the Indirect Correspondence theory of truth, presented 
by Horgan and Potrč. According to this theory, 'The sun moved behind the trees' 
is true at face value. Unlike Paraphrase Strategy, Indirect Correspondence claims 
that everyday discourse need not be ontologically serious. Unlike Error Theory, 
Indirect Correspondence claims that truth holds even though there is no object to 
which 'the sun' refers; furthermore, there is not always a systematic way to reduce 
such utterances to ones that are more ontologically serious. 
The three theoretical positions sketched above each attempt to resolve the 
problem faced by an austere ontology. There is a certain sense in which an 
utterance of 'the table in front of me exists' reflects how the world is. Normally, 
one could explain this by appealing to a kind of object that is meant by use of the 
word 'table', a material object that is referenced by the definite description 'the 
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table in front of me', etc. But one who denies that many such objects exist, as a 
proponent of (N) does, cannot avail himself of these tools. One is therefore in 
need of an explanation. 
The next several pages will contain considerations for each of the three 
views. Indirect Correspondence, however, will see substantially more discussion 
than Paraphrase Strategy or Error Theory. There are two reasons for this. The 
first is that Indirect Correspondence is enormously difficult to summarize in a 
few sentences. Elaboration on what the view even is, then, requires extensive 
digression. Secondly, Indirect Correspondence – or at least as presented by 
Horgan and Potrč – is a fairly recent view in contemporary metaphysics. I believe 
that the arguments presented below are therefore by necessity novel. Much has 
been written on Paraphrase Strategy and Error Theory already, and much of what 
I could say on the matter would merely be reference to philosophers x, y, and z. 
Therefore my discussions of the latter two views are restricted to merely 
convincing the reader of the falsity of one and the truth of the other. Substantially 
less exegesis is required. 
Paraphrase Strategy works by converting everyday discourse into literal 
claims about the world. As noted above, an utterance of 'The sun moved behind 
the trees' is true because it can be unpacked into a complex series of claims about 
various astrological facts. According to van Inwagen, we might read the utterance 
as saying something like “Owing to a change in the relative positions and 
orientations of the earth and the sun, it came to pass that a straight line drawn 
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between the sun and this point (which is on the surface of the earth) would have 
passed through the trees,” (van Inwagen 112-113). 
Such an analysis is problematic because it creates a disconnect between 
the intentions of an utterance by the speaker and an utterance itself. Consider two 
separate utterances of 'The sun moved behind the trees'. Utterance A is made by a 
10th-century English peasant on his 20th birthday. Utterance B is made by a 21st-
century physics student on his 20th birthday. What the English peasant intended 
to say is that, quite literally, the yellow object in the sky moved until it was 
behind the trees. The physics student, however, did not literally mean the sun 
moved while the trees remained stationary; he utilized Paraphrase Strategy to cite 
a complex astronomical fact in six words. No such intention existed for the 
peasant. Indeed, if one were to ask him if he, in actuality, meant to say that the 
earth rotated until light emanating from the sun was obscured by trees he would 
say no.  
This places Paraphrase Strategy before another dilemma. Utterance A is 
either true or false. If it is false, then an explanation is required. Under what 
conditions does a paraphrase succeed? Is it just in case the speaker is aware of the 
relevant facts and intends to use a particular utterance as a paraphrase for them? If 
this were the case, an enormous – perhaps insurmountable – epistemic burden is 
placed before any individual who hopes to say something true about the world. 
But if we maintain that what the peasant said is true, then there is reason to 
conclude that intention need not have any bearing on the truth of an utterance. 
After all, the peasant and the student intended to say very different things. If one 
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maintains – as I do – that speaker intentions play a vital role in a semantic theory 
in determining the proposition expressed by a speaker, one should seek an 
alternative to Paraphrase Strategy.
27
 
The Indirect Correspondence theory of truth, presented by Horgan and 
Potrč, appeals to two different standards for truth evaluation. The first, Direct 
Correspondence, is a relatively rare semantic standard, only applicable when one 
is serious about his metaphysics, i.e. when discussing ontology. According to DC 
standards, a sentence is true if and only if the ontic claims made in the sentence 
reflect existing ontology.
28
 For example, 'The sky is blue' is DC true if and only if 
the single object referred to by 'the sky' has the property referred to by 'blue'.  
Usually, though, a speaker is not all that concerned with directly referring 
to actually existing objects. In these contexts one evaluates sentences under 
Indirect Correspondence standards. These standards are not systematic, however, 
and vary across contexts. As evidence of this, Horgan and Potrč cite the 
compelling presentation given by David Lewis on context-sensitive semantics. 
They then apply this idea to ontological claims. 
According to Lewis, the truth-value of a claim is dependent upon the 
context in which it is made. In other words, there is not a direct correspondence to 
utterance uttered and proposition expressed. For example take an utterance of 
‘The pavement is flat’. When I am talking to my father about the new road paved 
downtown, this is true. The standards, so to speak, of ‘flat’ are not very high. So 
long as the road generally has a uniform height, the proposition expressed is true. 
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 In Objects and Persons, Trenton Merricks denies Paraphrase Strategy on similar grounds. I will 
turn to his positive account later in this section. 
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 I take “ontic claims” to be those claims that an utterance makes if taken literally 
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But if I am talking to my physicist friend about the same road, and discussing the 
molecular distribution of the pavement in question, the proposition expressed is 
false because in this case the standards of ‘flat’ are higher. Thus, two different 
utterances of the same sentence may, in different contexts, express different 
propositions.  
According to Horgan and Potrč, ‘exists’, like ‘flat’, is a context-sensitive 
word. An utterance of ‘tables exist’, when made by my father, expresses a true 
proposition. An utterance of ‘tables exist’, when made by my metaphysically-
serious friend,
29
 expresses a false proposition. Again, this is because context 
affects the semantics of existential claims. Thus, existential claims are not true or 
false simpliciter. Such a claim is DC-true (that is, true under Direct 
Correspondence standards) if and only if there is a corresponding object in the 
correct ontology. For example, ‘tables exist’ is true if and only if there exists 
some object that is denoted by use of the word ‘table’. Existential claims are IC-
true (that is, true under Indirect Correspondence standards) if and only if there is a 
corresponding object or objects in the correct ontology, when accounting for 
context-sensitive semantics. ‘Tables exist’ is true when uttered in a context that is 
less ontologically strict. This ends up being most contexts, with exception to 
discussions taking place “in the Ontology Room.”  
To repeat. Claims made in a Direct Correspondence context are true when 
the ontic claims match the ontology of the world. Indirect Correspondence claims 
are true in virtue of the way the world is, but are not made true in any thoroughly 
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systematic way. That is, there are no exceptionless rules to evaluate whether or 
not a sentence is true. 
Horgan and Potrč’s Indirect Correspondence theory is, importantly, 
different than both Paraphrase Strategy and Error Theory. They claim that 
sentences are IC-true in virtue of the world and that such sentences might not be 
paraphrase-able to sentences following DC standards. The problem now is that 
we're left with a non-systematic way of evaluating sentences. Our semantics 
cannot be given in "rule" form, and that's weird. 
They defend this oddity by arguing that the human mind also does not 
operate under systematic, exceptionless rules. That is, (if I am correctly using the 
terminology) they deny computational cognitive science. The reasoning is, 
frankly, beyond me. I will therefore grant them their arguments from cognitive 
science on the basis of ignorance. 
Instead, I will present two serious concerns to this view that are 
independent of arguments in cognitive science. The first is that, presumably, other 
organisms do operate under some form of computational, "rule governed" 
cognition.
30
 Worms, or a similarly neurologically simple organism, might be an 
example. Given that humans evolved from some version of such a simple 
organism, how did it come about that some species switched from computational 
cognition to non-computational cognition? That is, there are some organisms that 
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 Further discussion of this issue has seemed to suggest that it might actually be the case that all 
nervous systems are noncomputational in nature. To this reply I would suggest that there are 
some organisms, those without nervous systems, that operate computationally, and an 
analogous argument can be constructed from that fact. 
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are simply too primitive to be capable of the complexities required of a non-
systematic cognition; these organisms share an ancestor with humans.  
Because of this, if Horgan and Potrč are going to hold themselves to the 
claim that human cognition really is noncomputational, then it must be 
evolutionarily so. That is, humans (or an ancestor of humans) evolved into such a 
cognitive state. This means that noncomputational cognition is either 
evolutionarily neutral, or evolutionarily beneficial.
31
 
 If it is evolutionarily neutral, then noncomputational cognition developed 
through some sort of genetic drift. This would imply that there should be the 
possibility of computationally-thinking humans. This is problematic for the 
following reason. Horgan and Potrč justify their theory of semantics with their 
theory of cognition. But if noncomputational cognition were evolutionarily 
neutral, the following argument could be run: 
(1) If the semantics of a species always follows systematic, exceptionless rules, 
then Indirect Correspondence is false. 
(2) If a noncomputational cognition is evolutionarily neutral, then there are 
some species that do not have a noncomputational cognition. 
(3) If a species does not have a noncomputational cognition, then its semantics 
always follows systematic, exceptionless rules. 
(4) A noncomputational cognition is evolutionarily neutral . 
(5) (Therefore) The semantics of some species always follows systematic, 
exceptionless rules. 
(6) (Therefore) Indirect Correspondence is false. 
 
Premise (1) follows from the following consideration. Horgan and Potrč 
present their nonstandard semantics in an effort to reconcile their ontology with 
their commitment to the truth of everyday claims. To do this, IC semantic 
standards need only some existing object that is connected to the claim in some 
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point across. 
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way. How this works exactly, as we have said, is unclear. But it is unclear 
precisely because there is no way to present systematic, exceptionless rules for it. 
Consider the following scenario. There is a species that has a robust language. If 
this species had a systematic, exceptionless rule-governed semantics, then Horgan 
and Potrč’s defense of Indirect Correspondence fails. There would be no way to 
reconcile the species’ true ontic claims with true ontological claims because this 
species is incapable of making IC-true claims.
32
 
Premise (2) reflects the nature of genetic drift. Evolutionarily neutral traits 
are only fixed through randomness. Because there are plenty of populations and 
species on Earth, one would expect populations with noncomputational cognition 
and populations with computational cognition. The exact population genetics 
behind the premise are obviously more complex, but the details, along with some 
reasonable auxiliary claims, make (2) plausible. 
As noted above, Horgan and Potrč’s defense of semantics without 
systematic, exception-less rules amounts to an appeal to noncomputational 
cognition. The absence of such a cognition is therefore an absence of such a 
semantics. Hence, premise (3). 
Premises (4)-(6) are simply ex hypothesis and logical consequences. If (1)-
(3) are true, then the conclusion, that Indirect Correspondence is false, follows. 
It seems, then, that Horgan and Potrč are forced to accept that 
noncomputational cognition is evolutionarily beneficial. Why is it evolutionarily 
beneficial, and why is it (presumably) not beneficial for other organisms? At the 
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 Either the species systematically makes false claims, or they are incapable of uttering ‘chairs 
exist’ with the same intention that humans do. The former is just a version of Error Theory, and 
the latter is implausible.  
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very least, Horgan and Potrč need to provide some significant empirical answers. 
This seems strange to me. Based on ontological and semantic commitments, they 
are required – if my argument is sound – to conclude certain biological facts. This 
rubs against intuitions for Humean recombination principles which suggest that 
the various ontological, semantic, and biological facts should be interchangeable. 
More specifically, Horgan and Potrč are committed to a necessary connection 
between existence monism, Indirect Correspondence, and noncomputational 
cognition. 
Through philosophical inquiry, we sometimes discover necessary truths. 
Perhaps it is the case that space and time by have certain features by necessity. 
Certainly, it is philosophy and not science that will determine if Cartesian dualism 
is true or false. But Indirect Correspondence is not an instance of such righteous 
philosophical impositions. It is, in effect, too empirical, and risks stepping on the 
toes of scientists. We should, as a general rule, at least try to prevent our 
ontologies from making controversial and verifiable biological claims. If an 
alternate semantic theory can be developed without such impositions, all the more 
reason to suspect the original. Let us then see if Error Theory is up to the task. 
In Objects and Persons, Trenton Merricks defends an ontology similar to 
that of van Inwagen. He claims that, while persons do exist, tables, chairs, and 
other ordinary objects do not exist. Instead, there are simples arranged table-wise, 
chair-wise, etc. Merricks disagrees with van Inwagen, however, in how we should 
understand everyday discourse about these objects. Recall that van Inwagen 
accepts a type of Paraphrase Strategy, whereby everyday discourse is often 
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shorthand for more ontologically precise claims. Merricks claims that such 
discourse is simply false – the main claim of Error Theory.  
As already mentioned, Error Theory requires an alternative account of 
sentence evaluation that differentiates claims like ‘The grass is green’ from claims 
like ‘The grass is blue’. The former are in some sense better than the latter. 
Merricks says that the former are “nearly as good as true”. Thus: 
Any folk-ontological claim of the form ‘F exists’ is nearly as good as true if and 
only if (i) ‘F exists’ is false and (ii) there are things arranged F-wise. So, for 
example, ‘the statue David exists’ is nearly as good as true because (it is false 
and) there are some things arranged Davidwise.”
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According to Merricks, ‘The grass is green’ is nearly as good as true and ‘The 
grass is blue’ is simply false. This is what grounds the difference between the two. 
 There is, however, one small modification that will be required. Merricks 
provides an account of Error Theory with respect to pluralist nihilism. While both 
it and existence monism are versions of compositional nihilism, Section Seven and 
Section Eight will argue that existence monism is preferable. It is therefore 
required that we modify the above account to accommodate existence monism: 
Any folk-ontological claim of the form ‘F exists’ is nearly as good as true if and 
only if (i) ‘F exists’ is false and (ii) the world is arranged F-ly. So, for example, 
‘the statue David exists’ is nearly as good as true because (it is false and) the 
world is arranged David-ly.” 
 
Extrapolating somewhat to include property fixation, ‘The grass is green’ is 
nearly as good as true because (i) it is false and (ii) the world is arranged green-ly 
where it is arranged grass-ly.  
Having presented a detailed account of Error Theory, one might object in 
the following manner. Surely the theory cannot be right. While it is true we often 
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talk loosely, we still usually say true things. But according to Error Theory almost 
everything we say is false. This is impossible. 
Is it? I admit that it is radical to claim that much of what we say is false. 
But it is radical just because the ontology included is so radical. We make 
reference to all sorts of objects that, according to compositional nihilism, do not 
exist. Of course the things we say are false. In light of our ontology, that just 
makes sense. What would be strange would be if we still managed to say true 
things even when referring to non-existing objects. Imagine, as Merricks does, the 
following conversation: 
A. There are chairs over there. 
B. Do you mean to say that there are some things over there such that they 
are chairs? Do you affirm ‘chairs exist’ in the most literal and 
straightforward fashion possible? 
A. Of course I do. You ask funny questions.
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But if Speaker A really does mean to affirm the literal meaning of ‘chairs exist’, 
then he must be saying something false. There are no chairs!  
According to Paraphrase Strategy, Speaker A still says something true. It 
just so happens that, clarification notwithstanding, he does not affirm ‘chairs 
exist’ in the most literal and straightforward fashion possible. This seems to be an 
even less plausible and charitable interpretation of everyday discourse. It is often 
the case that someone mistakes one thing for another and talks falsely about it. It 
is much less often that someone misunderstands what he himself is saying. 
Now, is it possible for someone to talk about tables and chairs and not say 
something false? Yes, so long as they are aware of what they are saying. Where 
physics students can now say false things and still communicate something true, 
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metaphysicians who accept compositional nihilism (and existence monism) can 
say false things and still communicate something true. Their talk of tables and 
chairs are shorthand for more ontologically precise claims. Thus, Error Theory 
for everyday discourse holds, but more ontologically serious people can utilize a 
restricted version of Paraphrase Strategy. 
 
Section Seven 
Thus far, we have argued for (N), in large part by pushing hard on (U) and 
(C). The goal of the paper, however, is to argue for both (N) and (M). (M) is 
metaphysically dependent on (N). Above, it was said that a true theory of 
composition should be necessarily true. According to (N), then, all worlds have 
only simple objects. If there were a possible world with a composite object then 
(M) would be false.
35
 I hold (M) to be necessarily true. Therefore, proving (M) 
requires first proving (N).  
Still, there are other theories of composition that do not entail (M). Most 
proponents of compositional nihilism, in fact, would deny (M).
36
 Even some of 
those who offer arguments in favor of (M), like Schaffer, ultimately subscribe to 
some other position. For most, pluralist nihilism is the preferred alternative. 
According to pluralist nihilism, the simples that exist in a world are relatively 
small. These simples gather and appear, to us, to form objects. For example, what 
one might call a chair is, in fact, a collection of very small simples arranged chair-
wise.  
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 For examples, see Sider, Dorr, and Heller – although Heller is a special case. 
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One point in favor of existence monism is ontological simplicity. One of 
the original motivations for compositional nihilism was the desire for a simple 
ontology – why posit objects that do not serve some sort of purpose or provide an 
explanation, and are just unnecessary metaphysical baggage? The same 
methodological principle applies to most areas; as a species of Ockham’s razor, it 
tips the scales in favor of numerical simplicity. If existence monism is able to 
explain the world just as well as pluralist nihilism, then we should 
methodologically prefer it. Lacking a satisfactory argument for a plurality of 
simples, we should be inclined to favor an ontology that posits only one object, 
one simple, namely the world. But this is relevant only if the two views are 
explanatory equals. Most proponents of pluralist nihilism will deny this. 
Such a denial gains much of its plausibility by a simple line of reasoning. 
If we are going to admit that there are no large objects, then our simples, likewise, 
should not be large. Consider our chair. We would originally have said that this 
chair is composed of its legs and its top. Those parts, likewise, are composed of 
wood chunks. And the wood chunks are composed of smaller wood pieces, and so 
on down the line until we reach electrons and quarks. But once we accept (N), 
said table, legs, and wood chunks do not exist. The only things that exist, then, are 
those smallest of objects, electrons and quarks – or whatever physics tells us is 
below them. 
This reasoning is misguided, however. Yes, our original approach to 
composition held that larger composite objects were composed of smaller objects. 
This certainly would be true if composition ever occurred. But it doesn’t. Why, 
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then, should we subject ourselves to such a restriction? There is even precedence 
for supposing otherwise. 
The parts need not be prior to the whole. Consider a circle. We can split 
the circle into two semicircles, but would we want to say that the circularity of the 
circle depends upon the semicircles? Certainly not – they’re called semicircles for 
a reason! Mathematically, a circle is an infinite number of points R distance from 
some fixed point. Maybe, then, the circularity of the circle is dependent upon 
these points and some spatial relations. Fine. But even if we take this as our 
picture, then the semicircles are not prior to the circle. Instead, the circle is prior 
to the semicircles via the points of which said circle is composed. Even if we 
accept this metaphorical “point nihilism”, we see that the chain of priority 
assumed in physics-like reasoning – one thing being composed by smaller, more 
fundamental, parts, which are in turn composed of smaller, more fundamental 
parts – is broken. Establishing priority is more complex than simply stating, 
“smaller, therefore prior.”  
In his paper, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole”, Schaffer argues that 
mereological wholes are prior to their parts. He takes this thesis to its extreme, 
and concludes that in actuality “the cosmos is fundamental,” (Schaffer 31). 
Schaffer believes in priority monism. Unlike existence monism, this view is 
committed to the existence of composite objects. The two views agree that 
fundamental metaphysics ends at the world level. Priority monism does so by 
claiming that the various parts of the world are ultimately grounded in the world 
itself. Existence monism does so by claiming that there just is the world itself. For 
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the sake of exposition, in what follows I will sometimes blur the distinction 
between the two views. But because both deny the necessity of “micro-oriented” 
grounding, this is unproblematic. 
According to Leibniz, “a composite is nothing else than a collection or 
aggregatum of simple substances” (1968, 251). Thus, we would say the building 
truly gets its shape from the bricks. But, Schaffer argues, it is a mistake to say that 
all composites are mere aggregates. As the circle example above shows, there are 
at least two different types of composites: “mere aggregates and integrated 
wholes,” a pile of sand being an example of the former and a circle and an 
organism being examples of the latter (Schaffer 47). 
As far as common sense goes, Schaffer suggests that priority bifurcates in 
these two instances. When the whole exhibits unity, as an organism does, we say 
that it is prior to its parts. As Aristotle tells us, “it’s not a hand in just any and 
every old way that’s a part of a man, but one that is capable of fulfilling is work, 
ergo, one that is ‘ensouled’; but not ensouled, not a part,” (1985, 28). The 
functions of the human hand are defined by their integration in the whole 
organism. Thus, facts about the human’s parts are grounded in facts about the 
whole human. This is an example of “macro-oriented” grounding, and therefore 
acts as a counterexample to the necessity of “micro-oriented” grounding. 
Once we allow for instances of “macro-oriented” grounding, it becomes 
an open question what the appropriate direction of grounding is. Is the composite 
a mere aggregate or is it an integrated whole? Returning to our comparison 
between pluralist nihilism and existence monism we can ask the following 
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question: does the world exhibit a level of unity like that of a mere aggregate or 
like that of an integrated whole? If the former, then there is reason to suppose that 
pluralist nihilism is true. If the latter, then there is reason to suppose that existence 
monism is true. 
Why might one think that the world as a whole is an integrated whole? 
Perhaps I am being overly optimistic, but it seems to me as if the world is much 
more like a cat than a pile of sand. Still, it is not completely unreasonable for 
some, in a more pessimistic mood, to see the world as a giant, messy collection of 
more-or-less independent events. The above arguments for ontological simplicity 
and “macro-oriented” grounding are meant merely to support the plausibility of 
existence monism. More aggressive arguments against pluralist nihilism will 
follow in the next section.   
Section Eight 
In this section I will address a problem that, as I see it, sharply 
differentiates existence monism from pluralist nihilism. How does a proponent of 
existence monism explain variation across space-time? That is, given that the 
world is not uniformly green or red, circular or square, cold or hot, and instead 
exhibits an enormous amount of complexity and variation, existence monism 
needs to provide some explanation of said phenomena. In the first part of this 
section, I will explicate the problem further, and explain how it vividly 
differentiates existence monism and pluralist nihilism. In the second part, I will 
attempt to present what has thus far been said on the matter. Schaffer, Horgan, et 
al., in developing their ontologies, have said that only the world as a whole has 
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fundamental properties. In response to the initial answer of world-level property 
attribution by these philosophers, Sider has gone through an interesting 
progression of thought. It is worthwhile to observe how he has assuaged (some of) 
his own qualms about existence monism. Last, I argue that spatiotemporal 
variation is absolutely no problem at all for existence monism and may, in fact, 
actually be a problem for pluralist nihilism.  
In this section, only existence monism and pluralist nihilism will be given 
serious consideration. I assume (at least for the sake of expediency) that we have 
narrowed down the set of possible ontologies to these two.  
Recall that there are at least three semantic theories one could have to 
reconcile one’s austere ontology with everyday discourse. All three, however, will 
have to be adapted to the specific ontology. Thus, whether one proscribes to Error 
Theory or Paraphrase Strategy or Indirect Correspondence Theory, the manner in 
which semantics interacts with ontology is different. Consider Paraphrase 
Strategy. As presented by van Inwagen, Paraphrase Strategy says that everyday 
claims like ‘The sun moved behind the trees’ are shorthand for claims about a 
more complex series of facts. But the facts according to existence monism are 
different than those according to pluralist nihilism.  
The two theories differ in the number of simples posited, and the spatio-
temporal extension of the simples. Loosely speaking, existence monism takes 
there to be one very large simple, and pluralist nihilism takes there to be many 
very small simples. This affects the way in which semantics identifies true claims 
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because, at least prima facie, truth should be grounded in the fundamental reality 
of the world. What that fundamental reality is, therefore, is important.  
Take an utterance of ‘There exists a chair’. Assume Paraphrase Strategy. 
According to pluralist nihilism, such a sentence, if it is true, is not true in virtue of 
there being an object denoted by ‘chair’ and said object existing in the sense 
intended. Instead, the utterance is made true by the simples involved in such a 
claim. Here, we have a set of simples arranged “table-wise” and these simples, by 
being in such a configuration, make the claim true. It is as if the simples really did 
compose a new object. In reality, of course, no such object exists. Nonetheless the 
utterance is true. 
The story told by existence monism is similar. While there is no object or 
class of objects denoted by ‘chair’, nonetheless such a claim is true because of 
how the simple is configured. Using Schaffer’s terminology, we can say that the 
world is “table-y” in the relevant location. The world is such that there appears to 
be a unique object that exists. In reality, of course, no such object exists. 
Nonetheless the utterance is true.
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Now, while a very rough sketch was made of the analogous replies 
existence monism and pluralist nihilism can give, more must presently be said. 
The answer given by the latter view is, I will grant, a more intuitive answer. This 
is because pluralist nihilism seems to be reinforced by the advancement of 
science. When science explains phenomena, it does so by positing various 
entities, relations, and properties. For example, one’s perception of an apple 
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falling to the ground is caused in part by there being two objects, an apple and a 
planet, and a force of attraction – gravity – between the two. Similarly, children of 
blue-eyed parents also have blue eyes because each parent transfers an allele that 
codes for blue eyes.  
Of course, pluralist nihilism does not want to posit the existence of things 
like apples, planets, and alleles. Still, there is a trend in science – particularly 
when physics is involved – where the features of one object are explained via the 
features of smaller objects. Thus, a glass of water behaves the way it does because 
of the hydrogen bonds present between H2O molecules. Hydrogen bonding 
among H2O molecules is explained by the interaction of electrons. And if the 
evidence were such, science would explain the interaction of electrons through 
some other entity, so on down the line. One version of pluralist nihilism says to 
take the most fundamental of our scientific posits as being the only existing 
material things.
38
 These posits, whatever they may be, are the only material 
objects that exist.  
Thus existence monism’s method of explanation appears to go in the 
counterintuitive direction. Why would the behavior of the glass of water be 
explained by the structure of the whole world when science seems to tell us that, 
first, the behavior is explained by interaction between molecules and, second, the 
“direction” of explanation is towards smaller entities? Because the material world 
is just the one with which science is concerned, one would expect a philosophical 
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theory about the material world to be backed by scientific knowledge. Yet there 
seems to be no such support for existence monism.
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Prima facie, such an explanation is trivial for pluralist nihilism (and even 
more ordinary ontologies) in that variation of instantiated properties is explained 
just by variation of relevant scientific objects, properties, etc. There appears to be 
a chair in this region of space-time because there are some simples arranged 
chair-wise. Some collection of fundamental features exhibit what we perceive as 
solidity, and where these features are not present, the perceived solidity is also not 
present. 
Pluralist nihilism can say, roughly, that there is some property P, and said 
property is affixed to a particular simple, x, such that Px. Similarly, a relation R 
holds between two simples, x and y, such that Rxy. A few strongly intuitive 
theories about the interaction of objects with space-time would finish the picture. 
For instance, if a region of space-time contains an object x that has property P, 
property P will (usually) be exhibited, present, or observable in that region. If 
such a property is perceivable, then we perceive it in this region just because the 
relevant object occupies said region. 
The picture for existence monism is somewhat more complicated. As 
noted above, fundamental features of the world are properties of the world 
simpliciter. There are no further material objects for properties to adhere to. Thus, 
there needs to be some way to account for variation across space-time. If we said 
that there is some property P, and said property is affixed to a particular simple, x, 
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such that Px, we would be in trouble. There is only one simple: the world. Prima 
facie, many properties do not apply to the world simpliciter. Brownness is not a 
property of the world as a whole. Instead, we would want to say that brownness is 
a property exhibited in only some space-time regions that the world occupies. 
Further, we do not want to say that, instead of brownness, the world has the 
property of brownness-at-such-and-such-a-region. Such properties at least appear 
to be gerrymandered, and are therefore to be avoided. Existence monism should at 
least try to provide a better answer that is not committed to such properties. This 
immediately complicates the picture because some additional notion is required to 
make sense of variation across space-time. Property affixation is no longer 
representable by something as simple as Px.  
But there is reason to think that an alternative picture could be given. In 
his paper, “Extended Simples”, Kris McDaniel presents the Principle of 
Qualitative Variation: 
(PQV): For any object x, regions R+, R1, and R2, and intrinsic properties F1 and 
F2, if (i) x occupies R+, (ii) R1 and R2 are non-overlapping proper subregions of 
R+, (iii) F1 is not identical to F2, (iv) x instantiates F1 at R1 but does not 
instantiate F2 at R1, and (v) x instantiates F2 at R2 but does not instantiate F1 at 
R2, then there are two objects x1 and x2 such that (a) x1 is not identical to x2, 
(b) x1 and x2 are non-overlapping proper parts of x, and (c) x1 instantiates F1 
and x2 instantiates F2. 
 
This principle, I think, gets at the above problem existence monism faces in 
regards to spatio-temporal variation. If the world instantiates a property in one 
region but not another – and surely it does – then according to (PQV) the world 
has proper parts. This, of course, contradicts existence monism, for according to it 
there are no proper parts of any material object. 
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 Pluralist nihilism is not pressured by (PQV) because it need not account 
for variation in its posited simples. That is, it is not obvious that a simple posited 
by pluralist nihilism instantiates different properties in different regions the 
simple occupies.
40
 If it could be demonstrated that pluralist nihilism’s simples still 
contain spatio-temporal variation, then the two theories would be equal on this 
front. But a demonstration of this kind is beyond both the capability and scope of 
this paper; I only later raise some worries against assuming otherwise. 
McDaniel’s paper focuses on problems of extension, but the dialectic can 
be generalized to any intrinsic property. (PQV), along with the intrinsicality of 
shape, implies the impossibility of extended simples, and therefore the denial of 
existence monism.
41
 At this juncture we could deny either (PQV) or the 
intrinsicality of shape. Ideally, a proponent of existence monism will deny (PQV); 
otherwise, one merely dodges the extension-problem to be mowed down by the 
salvo of almost-any-other-property-problems.
42
 McDaniel suggests two ways to 
reject (PQV). One option, developed by Markosian, involves an appeal to stuff or 
matter as substances themselves, along with material objects, space-time, and 
whatever else one may be committed to. I would like to avoid such a move if 
possible, on account of ontological parsimony. The other option is to index 
intrinsic properties to regions of space-time. 
Recall that according to perdurantism objects extend over both space and 
time. For example, a chair does not wholly occupy some region of space. Rather, 
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 In fact, according to Sider’s construction of pluralist nihilism it is impossible. 
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 The exact argument turns on the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetatched Parts (DAUP), first 
presented by van Inwagen in “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. 
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 I am also, for the record, moved by McDaniel’s arguments for the extrinsic nature of shape.  
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the chair has a part at some time, t1, that occupies some region of space, r1. At 
some other time, t2, the chair has a part that occupies some region of space, r2 
(that may or may not be identical to r1). In this way, objects are “worm-like” 
entities that perdure through time. Perdurantism makes use of temporal parts. But 
is there a way to recreate the flexibility perdurantism offers in talking about the 
properties of something varying across time without committing oneself to 
temporal parts?  
Suppose properties were not held by objects simpliciter, but rather were 
indexed to a particular time. Thus, property affixation can be thought of as a three 
part relation holding between object, property, and instant or interval of time. 
Additionally, we take a perdurantism-like conception of objects. Objects extend 
through time, and the image remains that of a “worm-like” object with spatio-
temporal extension. This is a new view, so let us call it extended simple 
persistence. I define ESP as the denial of the following two claims: (1) Objects 
are wholly present at every time during which they persist, and (2) Objects have 
temporal proper parts. While it shares elements with both endurantism and 
perdurantism, it is not a version of either. Like perdurantism, objects are 
extended through space-time; like endurantism, objects lack proper parts - an 
arbitrary temporal slice, or any slice for that matter, is not a proper part of the 
object.
43
 The object is temporally simple. This view agrees with endurantism in 
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that it denies the existence of temporal parts. For those who are inclined towards 
perdurantism but are worried about temporal parts – as I am – this is an attractive 
view.
44
  
Acceptance of extended simple persistence is analogous to acceptance of 
(spatially) extended simples. Likewise, acceptance of maximally simple 
persistence is analogous to acceptance of (maximally) extended simples. That is 
to say, MSP is the temporal equivalent of the claim that there is only one spatially 
extended object. It is MSP, and not the weaker ESP, that is required for the spatio-
temporally extended version of existence monism.  
The strategy of temporal indexing can be adapted for spatial variation. By 
denying (PQV), we claim that intrinsic properties need not be “wholly” 
instantiated by objects. That is, as with temporal indexing, we index properties to 
a spatial region. Thus, property affixation can be thought of as a three part relation 
holding between object, property, and point or region of space.
45
 This has the 
additional benefit of allowing one to collapse the two notions of temporal 
indexing and spatial indexing into one notion of spatio-temporal indexing. After 
all, if we are committed to the view that time acts very much like an additional 
spatial dimension, then why not suppose that spatial property indexing functions 
the same as temporal property indexing? And if they function identically, why not 
                                                                                                                                                               
sub-T is any occupiable sub-region of T whatever, there exists a material object that occupies the 
region sub-T and which is a part of M. 
44
 I am not 100% convinced that a spatio-temporally extended world-view is better than a merely 
spatially extended world-view. But because I assume that if I can successfully defend the former 
then I can successfully defend the latter, I will continue arguing for MSP.  
45
 Sider explicitly denies this position in “Monism and Statespace Structure”, footnote 8.  
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further suppose that they are actually two sides of the same spatio-temporal 
indexing coin? 
Of course, this has the unfortunate implication that intrinsic properties are 
not intrinsic in the same sense traditionally assumed; intrinsic properties rely just 
as much on space-time as on the object itself. Is this so problematic, though? The 
thought-experiment to test intrinsicality is to imagine perfect duplicates of the 
object, and see if every duplicate has the property in question. Recall that the 
ontology being defended by existence monism is one in which there is one single 
object extended through space and time. The only duplicate is one which is itself 
the single object of the world – the world itself. There are no other material 
objects with which the world can interact. Thus, all properties that are 
traditionally assumed to be extrinsic are, by definition, intrinsic. 
 But surely we want to say that the property redness is different in some 
way than the property being a father. Spatio-temporal property indexing affords 
just such a difference. To give a very quick and dirty picture we need to introduce 
some terminology. A duplicate region of r is a possible region of space-time that 
is trans-world identical to an actual region of space-time r.
46
 A maximal duplicate 
set of r is the set of all possible worlds that contain a duplicate region of r. A 
property is a faux-intrinsic property of r if and only if it is exhibited in r in the 
actual world and in a duplicate region of r in every member of r’s maximal 
duplicate set. A property is a faux-extrinsic property of r if and only if it is 
exhibited in r in the actual world and not in a duplicate region of r in at least one 
member of r’s maximal duplicate set. Recall the above properties of redness and 
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being a father. According to our rough picture, redness is faux-intrinsic because, 
for every actual region, if that region exhibits redness then in all members of that 
region’s maximal duplicate set there is a duplicate region that exhibits redness. 
Being a father is faux-extrinsic because, for every actual region, if that region 
exhibits being a father then in at least one member of that region’s maximal 
duplicate set there is a duplicate region that does not exhibit being a father. This 
has the disadvantage of somewhat conflating the necessary/contingent distinction 
with the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. But I am unsure how any interesting 
properties could be necessarily indexed to a particular region. Let us then take this 
as, at the very least, the beginning of a more exact distinction. 
Despite being restricted to a monistic ontology, we have established a 
robust metaphysics that maintains many of the distinctions commonly 
acknowledged in the field. But the problem of spatio-temporal variation is not just 
a metaphysical one. How to interpret ‘The world is red here and not red here’, as a 
scientific claim, is not immediately obvious. It remains, therefore, to reconcile 
existence monism with science. Sider constructs a well-structured theory with 
which many of the semantic problems science poses to existence monism can be 
answered. We have already presented the general problem facing compositional 
nihilism. If we accept that there is something about the world that an utterance of 
‘There exists a chair’ gets right, then we must explain why this is so, even though 
we deny that there are any such objects as chairs. Sider defines this as the 
material adequacy constraint. A theory is materially adequate if it can reconstruct 
ordinary sentences into metaphysically-consistent sentences. Thus a materially 
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adequate view is one that offers answers that reconcile everyday experience and 
science with the underlying metaphysics. The answers given, however, will be 
particular to the theory because the ontology of each is different. 
Sider acknowledges this difference, and uses it as a primary motivation 
against existence monism.
47
 In “Monism and Statespace Structure”, he says “[T]he 
monist faces a special challenge. For by “piggybacking” on scientific 
explanations, pluralists (i.e. monism’s opponents) can give a detailed grounding 
story in a way that monists cannot,” (Sider, 4).  
There are some implicit steps, however, required to successfully arrive at 
this challenge to monism. First, it must be that “scientifically ultimate facts” do in 
fact explain to some extent how the world is. Let us assume this is true; it would 
be a knock against the view if existence monism, rather than pluralist nihilism, 
invalidated all of science.  
But is it the case that pluralist nihilism can, or even should, “piggyback on 
science” in a way that existence monism cannot? Sider says that any reconciliation 
of everyday experience (represented by ‘There exists a chair’ and ‘I observe an 
inflating balloon’) follows two steps. The first step is to consult one’s scientific 
base, with respect to the perception of objects, until one has arrived at what Sider 
calls “scientifically ultimate facts”. Such facts, he says, are those for which no 
further (scientific) explanations are given. 
Because our goal is to demonstrate that everyday experiences reflect in 
some way how the world is, we want to ground such experiences in what is 
fundamental. This requires grounding the results of step one in the fundamental 
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reality of the world. That is, we need to now explain scientific facts in terms of 
metaphysical facts. This is where the two views deviate. Pluralist nihilism can say 
that “the ‘scientifically ultimate features’ are in fact natural features,” (Sider 4). 
Here, then, fundamental scientific fact is identical to fundamental metaphysical 
reality, and the two-step explanation is instead one; there is no further work for 
pluralist nihilism. 
Further, Sider claims that such a move is not available to existence 
monism. This is because those ultimate features of science are not features of the 
whole world. Because the only object that exists, according to existence monism, 
is the world as a whole, fundamental features must be fundamental features of the 
world. Thus, ultimate features of science – which tend to describe features of 
smallish objects and regions of space-time – need to be “translated” into features 
of the world. 
Sider accomplishes this by appeal to the members and structure of the 
statespace. Take M to be the set of world-features that the world has or might 
have had. There is a certain way to arrange these, or at least sub-sets of these, in a 
special, appropriate manner. Thus, mass properties can be lined up in a continuum 
starting with having zero mass and continuing with having one gram of mass, 
having two grams of mass, and so on infinitely.  “Anyone who doesn’t know that 
that’s the right way to line up the mass properties is missing some information 
about mass,” (Sider 8). Further, the properties of spatial location can also be 
arranged in a grid-like structure.
48
 Take all properties that might be instantiated by 
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the world. These properties, when combined with other properties (including 
space-time), provide an ordered structure of the world. This structure is statespace 
structure. 
This additional notion of statespace structure allows one to construct a 
notion of truth that preserves material adequacy. Suppose that fundamental 
scientific posits existed. These scientific posits also provide a structure to the 
world. But according to existence monism, tables, chairs, and fundamental 
scientific posits do not exist. Still, the world also has a certain structure, M. 
Roughly speaking, these structures can be compared for identity: 
In slightly more detail: “microfictions” will be defined as fictional accounts of a 
world of subworld things and their natural features. The monist can use the 
structure of M to pick out one microfiction as being “apt”. The apt microfiction 
is, roughly, the one that would give rise to a statespace whose structure 
matches the structure that M actually has, if statespace structure were 
generated combinatorially from the number and nature of natural subworld 
features. And finally, the monist can say that the world is as if the apt 
microfiction is true. 
 
One then can say that scientific discovery picks out a particular microfiction, 
completing the first step of reconciliation required for material adequacy. Then, 
existence monism can say that this is the apt microfiction, the structure of which 
corresponds with the structure M of the world. Finally, we say that the apt 
microfiction is the one grounded in metaphysical world-features. 
Microfictionalism is, according to Sider, the most viable option for 
existence monism. It is a way to account for spatio-temporal variation, which, as 
noted, is one of the biggest problems facing the view. To that extent, Sider’s 
construction is nothing but beneficial for existence monism. Nevertheless there are 
some assumptions made in the paper itself that I would contest. 
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Sider’s presentation of microfictionalism provides existence monism with 
a tool to move from fundamental science to fundamental metaphysics. This is 
only a problem, however, if the scientifically ultimate facts are not already 
features of the world. It is true that it is the standard of most sciences, physics in 
particular, to posit smaller entities to explain larger, more complex entities. Thus, 
the properties of a chair are explained by the properties of the relevant molecules, 
which are in turn explained by the properties of the relevant subatomic particles. 
As it stands, fields or strings or particles or whatever, according to physics, might 
explain interactions between all sorts of objects.  
But such a methodology – the explanation of wider-scope features through 
smaller-scope features – is not uniformly followed. Take, for example, the field of 
Biology. Here, the central focus is on the scientific posits of life, of organisms 
that have life, and the features of things with life. One might claim that life could 
be reduced to more fundamental features of chemistry, which in turn could be 
reduced to more fundamental features of physics. I contest that this is too hasty. 
For reasons outlined elsewhere, I insist that supervenience of one set of properties 
upon another does not warrant the establishment of an explains relation, and is 
therefore not sufficient for reduction.
49
 Having established this, I question how 
Sider can be confident that science will establish any meaningful “fundamental” 
features. According to Sider, scientific fundamentality holds just in case no 
further explanation is given. But perhaps we should be more careful when we talk 
of “explanation”. 
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Consider the sub-discipline of Ecology. Here, ecologists posit fairly large 
and complex entities with their own features, like populations and ecosystems. 
These entities are used to explain smaller entities, also with their own features: 
individual organisms and sets of organisms across space and time, etc. Is the 
former explained by the latter or is the latter explained by the former? Further 
complicating the picture is that, once we avail ourselves of such notions, we may 
use them to replace use of others. For example, the introduction and removal of 
various species from a location across time can be expressed using ecological 
succession. Shrubs did not enter a previously barren region; there is an ecological 
community in pioneering stage. Further, ecology attempts to explain population 
flux as a function of ecosystem dynamics. A food web is a form of explanation. If 
one were to attempt to explain a food web in some other terms, such as the 
interaction between predator and prey, I suspect an ecologist might note that he 
was getting it backward. The food web explains the interaction, not vice versa. 
In fact, pluralist nihilism needs something stronger than the claim that 
there are scientifically fundamental features. The scientifically ultimate features 
must also be the scientifically smallest features. Suppose that this were not the 
case. For example, suppose that the world consisted of spherical objects and that 
the property of being a sphere were a scientifically ultimate fact. Further, suppose 
that science also told us that there existed hemispheres that were parts of these 
spheres. The property of being a hemisphere might, then, be explained by the 
composite objects’ features. Pluralist nihilism would then run into trouble. 
Extrapolating from Sider’s method, the fundamental features of the world would 
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include being a sphere. Further, pluralist nihilism denies the existence of 
hemisphere objects, because they are not unexplained. This places the theory in 
the same boat as existence monism because now both are left with simples that 
exhibit spatiotemporal variation. Once we accept that science might posits objects 
that are “too small”, we can break the link between fundamentality and spatial 
minimalism. 
I suspect this rather hokey example gets at a more general worry about 
Sider’s reconciliation strategy. Consider his presentation of the first step of 
establishing material adequacy: “At the end of stage one, you will have explained 
the size of the balloon in terms of certain ‘scientifically ultimate facts’: whatever 
scientific facts you cited and did not further explain,” (Sider 4). The worry is that 
Sider seems to assume that the explains relation,
50
 as used by science, is transitive 
and asymmetric. But is this really the case? 
It seems entirely possible for the explains relation to follow any number of 
odd paths. Suppose in some world science explained the features of anything 
significantly large, like oceans, planets, and galaxies, in terms of features with 
smaller scope, and explained the features of anything significantly small, like 
electrons, molecules, and microscopic organisms, in terms of features with wider 
scope. In this world, the fundamental objects or features – if there are any – are 
neither particularly large nor particularly small. The explains relation then ends 
somewhere in the middle of the continuum of size. Also consider a world in 
which the chain of explanation is circular; the smallest posits are explained by the 
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largest posits. Asymmetry fails to hold in such a world, which results in there 
being no unexplained entities. Perhaps it is also possible for there to be 
unexplained posits of varying size. Thus, in one world electron-sized objects are 
unexplained, as are chair-sized objects. Transitivity might also fail to hold; we 
have already considered a world in which things are explained almost 
haphazardly in either direction – the actual world. In all the above cases the 
fundamental objects of the world will exhibit spatio-temporal diversity. 
Subscribing to pluralist nihilism here does not confer any advantage over 
existence monism. 
It is important to clarify the strength of the above notion of possibility. 
The above worlds are all at least conceptually possible. One might, though, insist 
that the above worlds are not nomologically possible, and therefore they are 
irrelevant to Sider’s account of fundamental scientific posits. To this I reply: what 
law of science is there that denies the possibility of these worlds? It is hard to 
imagine any scientific law that introduces the notions “explains” and 
“explanation”. Some scientific laws deal with notions of “causality”. Others 
simply predict statespace structures based upon initial conditions. None, that I 
know of, provide an account of “explanation”.
51
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 Objection (Kris McDaniel): “But they might still posit explanations that rule out worlds in which 
the properties of medium sized things are fundamental. Isn’t that what is really at issue?” 
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    The introduction of “explanation” might involve some meta-scientific 
theory. But I suspect such a theory would be properly classified as a metaphysical 
constraint.
52
 Thus I conclude that the above worlds are nomologically possible – 
or at least their nomological possibility is epistemically possible. Because they are 
nomologically possible, they pose as counterexamples to the assumption that the 
fundamental scientific posits must be small and not exhibit spatio-temporal 
variation. 
Let us now move from the negative account to the positive account. I wish 
to now present a somewhat independent theory of spatio-temporal variation. It is 
presented, certainly, with full awareness of the challenges already raised. 
Nevertheless I believe the line of reasoning approaches the problem from a 
slightly different direction. In particular, I will talk primarily in terms of objects, 
instead of features. I also depart from Schaffer, Sider, et al. in some significantly 
fundamental supplementary theories. For example, I explicitly deny super-
substantivalism. (In short, super-substantivalism is the claim that material objects 
just are regions of space or space-time. The two are identical.) Such commitments 
lead to a somewhat shifted discussion of spatio-temporal variation. 
What an electron is, science can tell us. What an object is, metaphysics 
can tell us. Thus, there is a disconnect between nomological possibility and 
metaphysical possibility. Surely, it is metaphysically possible for electrons not to 
                                                          
52
 It is important to distinguish “explanation” from “grounding”. Theories about the latter might 
be empirical, and therefore reflect nomological possibility. But Sider cannot mean that 
explanation is simply grounding. For one, he would have used the word ‘grounding’.  
66 
 
exist, or for light to be either a particle or a wave.
53
 But the nomologically 
possible worlds are restricted by whatever the correct scientific laws are. It is a 
mistake, therefore, to assume that science is engaging in any meaningful 
metaphysics, or making any meaningful ontological claims. 
I take ontology seriously, and I also take van Inwagen’s Special 
Composition Question seriously. As a metaphysical principle, both existence 
monism and pluralist nihilism subscribe to (N). The difference between the two 
views, at the level of ontology, comes with the number and nature of these 
simples. This is reflected in existence monism’s commitment to (M). 
I do not attempt to formulate pluralist nihilism, in part because I suspect 
there is no one formulation possible. Pluralist nihilism, like compositional 
nihilism, seems capable of holding distinct options within it. Sider implies just as 
much in his paper. If fundamental features are just the scientifically unexplained 
features, there is no reason to suppose that these features are fixed across possible 
worlds. Further, two proponents of nihilism could disagree on whether or not a 
theory with point-sized simples is preferable to one with extended simples. 
 What this shows us, however, is that the number of objects, according to 
existence monism, is fixed. All worlds contain the same number of objects: 1. 
What differs substantially, however, is the nature of this object. Pluralist nihilism, 
however, need not (and likely should not) fix the number of simples. This has the 
odd consequence that, without auxiliary theses, the set of possible worlds 
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according to existence monism overlaps with the set of possible worlds according 
to pluralist nihilism. To show why this is true, suppose Sider’s account is right 
and the unexplained features of science are the fundamental features of 
metaphysics. If in some world, w1, the unexplained features of science were of 
the world, then the two views would be undifferentiable relative to w1. In other 
terms, the ontological simples in w1 according to existence monism correspond 
perfectly with the fundamental scientific posits – and therefore the ontological 
simples – in w1 according to pluralist nihilism. What does that entail, exactly? It 
entails that it is at least conceptually possible for science to posit an extended 
simple with spatiotemporal variation. That is, it is possible for some worlds 
according to pluralist nihilism to be identical to some worlds according to 
existence monism. 
 Now, if this possible, then Sider’s arguments are in big trouble. As I see it, 
they are either diffused because the facts no longer stand in need of an 
explanation, or they will be equally employable against this particular world, w1. 
But if even a single world were like this, the whole of the advantage a proponent 
of pluralist nihilism seeks to gain is eliminated.  
Trouble explaining spatio-temporal variation in one world is no less 
problematic than trouble explaining spatio-temporal variation in all worlds, at 
least insofar as an argument relying on metaphysical principles is concerned. 
Assume that quantum entanglements demonstrate that the fundamental features of 
the actual world are world-level. The actual world also exhibits spatio-temporal 
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variation. Thus, any argument Sider could employ against existence monism is 
equally applicable to his pluralist nihilism.  
Sider can block this move by claiming that his theory is empirical. That is, 
his arguments can be taken to apply only if certain assumptions are met – namely, 
that the fundamental scientific features are small in scope. But then he is playing a 
dangerous game. With what strength is his theory to be taken? Certainly it would 
not be a metaphysically necessary theory. But, as I argued in Section Three, a 
proper answer to SCQ must be systematic and necessary. Sider’s pluralist 
nihilism, insofar as it merely takes the fundamental scientific entities to be 
fundamental metaphysical entities, is a proper answer. Once contingent claims 
about the world are introduced, however, the strength of his answer diminishes. 
 It might very well be the case that this “piggybacking” on science that 
pluralist nihilism is so apt to do will, in fact, be reason to opt for an alternative. 
This is because – as has been hinted throughout this paper – it is not at all clear 
that science will give us completely formulized, non-vague answers. Science is 
pretty sloppy. I recall a conversation I once had with my Biology professor about 
the nature of life. Given that life is the central concept of the field, there is 
naturally much debate on what the term means, exactly. In discussing some of the 
main competing views, I asked which he thought was most accurate. He replied 
that it was likely that none of them were quite right. Fair enough, I thought. But 
he went on to say that likely no view would be able to correctly define life. That 
is, he saw life as a necessarily vague notion. I was absolutely floored. And then I 
read van Inwagen’s Material Beings.  
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 Nevertheless, the point stands that there is some reason to avoid 
metaphysical vagueness. Sider will likely agree that metaphysical vagueness is to 
be avoided, and that any scientific posit that introduces vagueness is 
unacceptable. But this is to place a bet on what the end result of science will be – 
a bet that existence monism does not need to make. The fact that monistic 
statespace structure might introduce indeterminacy then becomes an advantage 
for existence monism. Suppose there is a vague scientific posit – perhaps life. 
Introduction of vague terms is problematic and, at the least, one needs to explain 
how they function in relation to fundamental metaphysics. In Material Beings, for 
example, van Inwagen takes great pains to assuage the mess that vague truth and 
existence, as a result of vague life, cause. But according to Sider’s 
microfictionalism, it is possible for there to be some sort of a disconnect between 
the fundamental metaphysical structure of the world and the microfictions that 
science’s subworld entities create. Recall that microfictionalism works by 
matching the state-space structure provided by the world, M, to the state-space 
structure provided by fictional subworld entities and their features. But as Sider 
notes, “utterly different microfeature fictions F1 and F2 might give rise to 
microstatespace fictions MF1 and MF2, each of which accurately describes M’s 
structure … If the structure of M does not single out a single way of talking about 
subworld entities and their natural features, then there would simply be no single 
correct way to talk in those terms,” (Sider 14). 
 This is advantageous just because it allows for a notion of vagueness in 
truth. There is no unique actual microworld fiction, and for any life there are a 
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variety of microfeature fictions that accurately describe the actual structure of the 
world. So, returning to the example of vague life, there is sometimes no simple 
fact of the matter if some object is part of a life or not. That is, there is no well-
defined demarcation of life in terms of subworld entities because no such 
demarcation exists. In Sider’s terminology, all microstatespace fictions fail to 
match the fundamental statespace structure of the world, M. Thus, it is as if such 
an important concept as life is vague. The failure to eliminate vagueness comes 
from unwarranted (though perhaps unavoidable) attention to subworld features. 
Existence monism, it seems, entitles one to both deny metaphysical vagueness and 
affirm the robustness of intuitive concepts like life. Life, as a metaphysically real 
thing, is not a cluster of sub-world properties, nor is it a vague property. Life is 
just impossible to represent when we only avail ourselves of microfeature fictions. 
 The upshot of this is that there is room in existence monism for a 
metaphysical notion of life. Sider’s pluralist nihilism cannot accommodate life 
because the only scientific entities that get “preserved” are the fundamental ones. 
Sider thinks that physics will provide the fundamental scientific entities. Physics 
does not even contain notions of life. So if not from physics, from whence comes 
the notion of life? Existence monism, in contrast, can provide an alternative, 
metaphysical, account of life. It does not suffer from the physics-lust that Sider’s 
theory does. 
 We can now see that pluralist nihilism, or at least as constructed by Sider, 
has a built-in problem. For if the theory “piggybacks” onto whatever science 
posits, then it is also forced to accept whatever vague, contradictory, or otherwise 
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unattractive claims science make, so long as said claims are unexplained. Like a 
lemming, proponents of Sider’s pluralist nihilism risk following scientists into the 
metaphorical water. Granted, life is something that science will likely say is 
explained in terms of something else. But there is still the risk of some other 
scientific posit being both unexplained and vague. Existence monism, or at least as 
constructed by Sider, allows one to in some sense distance – but not discredit – 
these unattractive claims from one’s fundamental metaphysics. We can have our 
cake and eat it too. 
There are other reasons to view non-monistic versions of compositional 
nihilism with trepidation. As noted by Sosa, Schaffer, and others, compositional 
nihilism is incompatible with the possibility of a gunky world. ‘Gunk’ is a term 
used to describe the nature of material objects. In a gunky world, all material 
objects are composite objects; for every material object there is some other 
material object that is its proper part. Like a chunk of amorphous gunk, we can 
carve any part of it at any point and still be able to carve it up further.  
It is, I think, fairly clear how compositional nihilism is incompatible with 
the possibility of gunk. Such a theory assumes that there is a smallest material 
object – that at some point along the line matter simply cannot be further 
divided.
54
 Given that we have thus far insisted that a theory of composition be 
necessarily true, it is even easier to run an argument against compositional 
nihilism:
55
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 This is not to say, though, that space itself is discrete. It is important here to keep in mind the 
distinction between space and the material objects that occupy it. 
55
 I use the property of extension, Ex, simply to fill out the restricted quantifier. Given that □ [∀x: 
x ∈ M] Ex, the process simply is shortened. 
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(1) □ ([∃x: x ∈ M] Ex ⊃ ~[∃y: y ∈ M] (Pyx ^ x ≠ y)) [follows from (N)] 
 (2) ~◊ ~([∃x: x ∈ M] Ex ⊃ ~[∃y: y ∈ M] (Pyx ^ x ≠ y)) [from (1)] 
 (3) ~◊ ([∃x: x ∈ M] Ex ^ [∃y: y ∈ M] (Pyx ^ x ≠ y) [from (2)] 
 (4) ~◊ ([∃x: x ∈ M] Ex ⊃ [∃y: y ∈ M] (Pyx ^ x ≠ y)[from (3)] 
 (5) ◊ ([∃x: x ∈ M] Ex ⊃ [∃y: y ∈ M] (Pyx ^ x ≠ y)) [possibility of gunk theory] 
 (6) (4) ^ (5) [conjunction] 
 (7) ⊥ [from (6)] 
 
Of course, one could simply say that the argument is not sound because 
(5) is false; gunk is simply metaphysically impossible. Admittedly, gunk seems 
conceptually possible. We can imagine in our minds a world that just keeps 
dividing: 1cm
3
 becomes ½ cm
3
 becomes ¼ cm
3
, etc. What is important here, 
however, is metaphysical possibility, and there seems to be no immediate reason 
to assume gunk theory is such. In fact, there may even be reason to suppose it is 
not. First, how matter is divided into material objects is a metaphysical question. 
True, electrons, protons, and quarks are the realm of physics. But what physics 
tells us can be, as many philosophers say, modified to fit the correct metaphysics. 
That is, even if physics posits such objects, this does not mean such objects 
actually exist. Theories that utilize such posits can be cashed out in a sounder 
world-view. Indeed, pluralist nihilism, and compositional nihilism in general, can 
take a page out of the existence monism book.  
In order to reconcile the complexity and variety in the world, existence 
monism adopts some system of local variation. That is, within the extension of a 
single object, properties are instantiated in some regions of space-time and not in 
others. Properties of objects are thus indexed to space and time. Similarly, 
suppose that physics continues to posit additional smaller objects, and somehow 
establishes that there is no smallest one. Pluralist nihilism can accommodate this 
by stating that physics is actually discovering facts about the local variation of 
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simples. This is possible because of the disconnect between discrete material 
objects and discrete space. Admittedly, this commits one to theses that he might 
not want, and indeed has reason to deny. But if the advancement of physics does 
not end up at some smallest object, pluralist nihilism is in trouble. All the more 
reason to favor existence monism. 
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Capstone Summary 
 Here’s a thought experiment. I have before me two slices of bread, a piece 
of ham, and a slice of cheese. They are set next to each other, not touching. What 
has to happen to make these scattered pieces of food become a sandwich? Do I 
need to put them together, ham and cheese inside the bread? Is that good enough 
to make a sandwich? 
 I want to make clear that I am not talking about when we think there is a 
sandwich. Most people think that when I put the various items together I form a 
sandwich. But someone thinking there is a sandwich is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for there being a sandwich. What if the bread, ham, and cheese were on 
Mars? Does that mean, because there is no one there to think there is a sandwich, 
that there is no sandwich? No. What if there were Martians that looked at the 
bread and the ham and the cheese but had no idea what sandwiches were? Does 
that mean, because the Martians do not think there is a sandwich there, that there 
is no sandwich? No.  There is an objective reality of whether or not something 
exists. That is what I care about. 
There is an ongoing debate in philosophy about the kinds of objects that 
exist. In particular, there is wide disagreement on the nature of composition. One 
way of framing the question of composition is, “under what circumstances do 
these things compose some additional thing?” For example, consider a regular, 
everyday table. It has various parts – legs, a top, and nuts and bolts. What is it that 
makes all these various parts a table? What “rules” are there that determine when 
the parts make a whole, when the wooden legs and metal bolts make a table? 
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 The various answers to this kind of question can be structured in three 
main groups. I call these three groups universalism, nihilism, and compatibilism. 
Universalism claims that no matter what two things you consider, there is always 
some other thing that is composed. So, there is some thing whose parts are the tip 
of my nose and the Eiffel Tower. Nihilism claims that no matter what two things 
you consider, there is never some other thing that is composed. So, no matter 
what you do, the wooden legs and metal bolts will never compose a table. 
Compatibilism claims that only sometimes do two things compose an additional 
thing. Sometimes the various things in question will compose another object, and 
other times they won’t; it depends on the circumstances 
 To help visualize the differences between the three views, let’s return to 
our ham sandwich. To be very specific, let’s name the things already here. There 
are two slices of bread. Call them bread1 and bread2. There is also a slice of ham. 
Call it ham1. There is also a slice of cheese. Call it cheese1. When is it such that 
these various things compose an additional object?  
The most obvious answer is that it’s just when you put the ham and the 
cheese between the bread that you make an additional object: a ham sandwich. 
This is a compatibilism-type answer because there are some rules that govern 
when there is an instance of composition, namely when ham1 and cheese1 are 
placed between bread1 and bread2. I’ll return to this kind of answer and explain 
why it’s problematic. But first let me explain the other answers. 
A universalism-type answer would say that, for each of these things there 
is another thing. Thus, there is an object whose parts are bread1 and bread2, 
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another object whose parts are ham1 and cheese1, and another object whose parts 
are bread1, bread2, ham1, and cheese1. What are all these various objects? Who 
knows. Furthermore, it doesn’t matter how far apart these things are from one 
another; they will always compose an object. So if I take the ham out of the bread, 
there is still an object. If I throw the ham on the floor, that same object exists. 
Even if I packed the cheese into a box and sent it on the next shuttle to outer 
space, that object would still exist. This thing, composed of bread1, bread2, ham1, 
and cheese1, always exists no matter how far apart the various parts are scattered 
across the world.  
A nihilism-type answer would say that, no matter what happens, there will 
never be another thing. No matter how you arrange bread1, bread2, ham1, and 
cheese1, you will never have a ham sandwich. Nihilism therefore denies that ham 
sandwiches exist. In fact, it denies that anything that has parts exists. Therefore 
tables and chairs (and perhaps even people) do not exist.  
 One who is unfamiliar with the various arguments for and against these 
views may be puzzled as to why there is even a debate about this. Isn’t it obvious, 
one might say, that compatibilism is true? Surely, there are rules that govern these 
sorts of interactions. Even more surely, we can do something to make a ham 
sandwich. But while it is true that this seems obvious, when one starts to think 
hard on the issue one realizes that there is a plethora of complications that quickly 
dilute the initial obviousness. 
 Recall what we said about the ham sandwich. It was just when we put the 
piece of ham and the piece of cheese inside the two pieces of bread that we made 
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a ham sandwich. But there is still a lot left unclear. The ham and the cheese need 
to be between the bread, but presumably we mean something stricter. If I have 
one piece of bread resting on top of the table, and the other underneath the table, it 
doesn’t matter that the ham and the cheese are between the two slices of bread. 
There is no ham sandwich because the bread is too far apart. 
Then how close do the two pieces of bread have to be to each other to 
make a ham sandwich? Perhaps the slices of bread need to be at most one inch 
apart. But that is an arbitrary answer. It seems ridiculous to say that there isn’t a 
ham sandwich because the two pieces of bread are just over one inch apart, and 
that when we cross that distance of five millimeters all of a sudden there is a ham 
sandwich.  
We want to say that the various parts have to be a certain distance from 
each other in order to make a ham sandwich. But we also want to say that there is 
no exact distance that marks the cutoff of ham sandwich and no ham sandwich. 
We’re stuck. This is a version of what’s known as the sorites paradox. In my 
paper, I use a more formal version of the sorites paradox to argue against 
compatibilist-type answers. 
Let’s give one more attempt for a compatibilist-type answer. What if the 
ham, cheese, and bread do not make a sandwich when they are scattered across 
the table because all the parts are not in contact? Further, when we bring the ham 
and the bread and the cheese close together, we make a sandwich not because the 
parts are a certain distance from one another, but because the parts are in contact. 
That seems a plausible answer. But here’s a problem. Shake someone’s hand. Did 
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you just create an object whose parts are you and the person whose hand you 
shook? Obviously not! But if being in contact with someone and creating an 
object is impossible, then so too is bread being in contact and creating a sandwich. 
What we say about the first case we must say about the second. Unless we accept 
the possibility that all sorts of things come into and out of existence at business 
meetings, then we are forced to abandon the “in contact” answer. 
 I argue for a particular type of nihilism. I do this in two ways. First, I 
argue for nihilism by demonstrating that compatibilism and universalism are false. 
Because nihilism is the only other alternative, nihilism has to be true. It’s the last 
man standing. Second, I argue for nihilism by providing a positive account of the 
theory that eases the problems that come with the view.  
 Material composition (as it is called in the field) is an issue with far-
reaching ramifications. The answers to the sorts of questions raised tell us what 
really exists. If the conclusions of my paper are right, then there really are no such 
things as tables, chairs, and ham sandwiches. That’s a pretty far-reaching effect.  
The practical implications are harder to see. We’re not going to stop 
making ham sandwiches and eating them on tables while sitting in chairs. But we 
can compare my thesis to the Copernican Revolution. Both have massive 
ramifications on our beliefs about the way the world is. Both also have massive 
ramifications in the relevant disciplines. But both have little to no effect on day-
to-day life. We still say things like “The sun moved behind the trees” even though 
we know they’re not true. Likewise, we still say things like “I’m making a ham 
sandwich” even though we know they’re not true.  
